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ACR: accusatory criminal proceeding
ADR: alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
ALBA: Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas 
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ESSF: Economic and Social Stabilization Fund
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Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain), formed in 1975.
G7: Former group of the G5 plus the United States and Canada (1976).
G8: The G7 countries plus Russia (1997).
G20: A group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 
major economies plus the European Union (EU) formed in 1999. Includes 
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina in Latin America.
IBSA: India, Brazil, and South Africa 
IDB: Inter-American Development Bank 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean
LAFTA: Latin American Free Trade Association
LAIA: Latin American Integration Association
MERCOSUR: Southern Common Market
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement
NDU: National Defense University 
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OAS: Organization of American States 
PA: public administration
PRF: Pension Reserve Fund 
SACN: South American Community of Nations 
UN: United Nations 
UNASUR: Union of South American Nations
WB: World Bank 
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Glossary
Amparo: Literally, protection, a legal initiative to assist individuals to gain access 
to the courts.
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA): A foreign policy development 
initiative by Venezuela dating from 2004.
Bolsa Familia: A governmental program in Brazil supported by the World Bank 
that gives money directly to families in exchange for keeping children in school 
and having regular health checkups. 
Cacerolazo: A popular form of protest, especially in Argentina, when protestors 
march banging pots and pans brought from their homes. 
Caudillo: A personalist leader; usually describes a head of an authoritarian 
government.
Caudillismo: A system or process characterized by personalist authoritarian rule.
Cetes bonds: Peso-dominated Mexican government bonds sold in the early 1990s.
Continuismo: A political pattern in which an elected leader finds a way to serve 
more than the original constitutionally mandated term of office.
Dutch disease: Refers to overdependence on a single valuable export commod-
ity (drawn from the historical Dutch experience of reliance on tulip exports), 
which distorts the value of the currency and makes other national products 
uncompetitive, further reinforcing single export dependency and less costly 
imports, thus reducing domestic production.
Familias en Acción: A governmental social assistance program in Colombia 
where monthly stipends are given directly to the mother of the house.
Favela: A Brazilian shantytown.
Fueros: Originally, special privileges granted to specific groups in medieval 
societies by the Crown.
Maquila: A factory granted tax concessions and other legal advantages to stimu-
late employment and exports; common throughout Central America and Mexico, 
especially along the United States/Mexico border.
vi   
Oportunidades: A government social assistance program for poverty alleviation 
in Mexico.
Solidario: A government social assistance program in Chile designed to provide 
for the poorest of the poor.
Tesobono: A Mexican government security that protects institutional investors 
from devaluation of the peso.
Tutela: Like amparo, a constitutional writ by the judiciary offering legal protec-
tion to individual citizens. 
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executive summary 
 
latin america 2060:  
assessing the region’s Present and  
Projecting its likely Future
Carlos Blanco and David Scott Palmer
This book is the product of a two-day meeting convened by Boston University’s 
Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future in Novem-
ber 2010 to discuss the many advances made by Latin America in recent years 
and to consider both the opportunities and the challenges the region faces over 
the next five decades. Leading scholars and practitioners from the United States 
and Latin America gathered to discuss the core concerns that are most likely to 
set the parameters of the region’s future. Specifically, we focused on sets of issues 
in five key areas: 
1) Economic growth and development 
2) Governance, democracy, and the state
3) Environmental sustainability 
4) Role of outside actors
5) Socio-cultural capacity 
Most of the participants, drawing on their areas of expertise as well as our 
exchanges in the meeting, finalized their analyses and projections resulting in 
the original articles appearing in this volume. In the concluding chapter, we also 
offer policy recommendations drawn from our individual analyses to suggest 
concrete steps that could be taken to deal with the issues discussed. Our collec-
tive goal is to contribute to the debate concerning the future of Latin America 
among the many communities who have a stake in the outcome of the complex 
dynamics now unfolding, from political and economic leaders to scholars and 
civil society.
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the baseline: Positive develoPMents, reMaininG ChallenGes
An assessment of Latin America1 circa 2010, which serves as the baseline for our 
projections, finds both positive developments and significant challenges. 
Politically, democratic procedures and practices have become the norm in the 
region for the first time, with elections in most countries characterized by robust 
competition and public acceptance of results. They include—quite remarkably 
given Latin America’s checkered political history—opposition victories across 
the political spectrum in all 20 countries except for Cuba over the course of the 
democratic “wave” that began in the late 1970s. Electoral outcomes also include 
both “top down” and “bottom up” populist experiments as well as victories by 
former guerrilla groups able to make the transition from the armed struggle to 
political party competition in the political arena. 
Economically, the region has experienced significant growth, usually under 
market liberalization, after the extended decline of the “lost decade” of the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Playing a major role in this growth through trade agreements 
and both direct and portfolio investments are such outside actors as the United 
States, several countries of the European Union (EU), and China. The sustained 
expansion of GDP during most of the first decade of the 21st century contributed 
to the ability of most Latin American countries to weather the developed world’s 
latest economic crisis of 2008–09 much better than they would have in the past. 
Socially and culturally, growth also contributed to significant improvement in 
such key indicators as levels of poverty, as well as to the expansion of educa-
tional opportunities at all levels. In many cases, the new resources available 
over the course of the decade contributed to poverty reduction exceeding 50 
percent of prior levels, largely through a combination of government programs, 
including conditional cash transfers, and private sector employment generation. 
Literacy rates are approaching 100 percent in a number of countries, and univer-
sity enrollment has more than doubled over the past two decades. Government 
spending on housing, sanitation, and police has improved the quality of life in 
many shantytowns throughout the region. 
1 The 20 independent republics of the former Spanish, Portuguese, and French empires in the New World: 
Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil.
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ConCerns For the Future
Despite the favorable current situation in important respects, however, the future 
is fraught with risks in several specific areas of concern. Major reforms, though 
in some cases already under way, will need to be fully carried out to enable the 
countries of the region to avoid future crises or at least limit their impact.
One major concern is economic: The recent impressive macroeconomic dyna-
mism is based on the export sector, specifically a more than doubling of com-
modity prices in recent years for such products as iron, copper, gold, oil, and 
soybeans. While the additional resources generated by this latest boom have 
strengthened fiscal accounts and have contributed to a variety of poverty reduc-
ing social programs, they have also contributed to a deteriorating competitive 
capacity in other sectors of the economy. One result is a growing current account 
deficit in almost every country. 
Present economic dynamics remind us of too many past examples in which 
Latin America’s historic dependence on primary product exports has gener-
ated boom-and-bust cycles. These cycles have created major internal economic 
disruptions over which individual country policy makers have little control, an 
outcome that could easily occur again. 
Outside actors have played a major role in stimulating economic growth in the 
region. Emerging markets, including Latin America, have become particularly 
attractive due to a combination of low interest rates in the United States, a weak 
dollar, high savings levels in China, and slow growth in Europe. Both U.S. trade 
and U.S. direct investment in Latin America have increased by more than 300 
percent since the early 1990s. However, Mexico and Central America have not 
experienced the same growth as South America. Mexico has a more diversified 
economy than many South American countries, but is increasingly dependent 
on trade with the United States. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicara-
gua have suffered from poor governance and an economic dynamic that relies 
too heavily on the export of labor.
China has become a new export destination for Latin American products, though 
its impact to date should not be overemphasized. While Latin American exports 
to China have doubled in the last five years, they still account for only seven 
percent of total regional trade, of which more than 80 percent is from just five 
countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Thus, only a few coun-
tries in the region are the most important beneficiaries of such expanded trade. 
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China’s demand for Latin American products will only increase in the future 
(particularly for oil, iron, copper, and soybeans), but the region must also take 
measures to counter such challenges as the Dutch disease, currency apprecia-
tion, and environmental degradation.
Any future reduction in regional economic growth will more than likely occur 
in the primary product sector, which is the base of the region’s economy. Slower 
growth in this sector, in turn, would almost certainly result in both lower foreign 
investment and reduced internal aggregate demand, among other effects.
A second major challenge stems from the relationship between Latin America’s 
natural resources and its population growth. Along with abundant and diverse 
mineral and agricultural capacities, the region has 26 percent of the world’s 
fresh water and produces 20 percent of its oxygen, but has just 13 percent of its 
people. However, population growth is anticipated to increase from 533 million 
to 786 million over the next 50 years, as significant reductions in infant mortal-
ity are combined with similar increases in longevity. Thus, the demand for these 
resources will grow rapidly to meet the need for food, water, energy, and industry. 
There are also major environmental impacts associated with population growth 
as well as with climate change. These impacts include continuing deforestation 
of what has been called “the lungs of the world,” a decline of fish stocks, the 
progressive loss of biodiversity, growing air pollution, and increasing scarcity of 
water in the region’s more arid areas.   
A third important challenge is political, relating to the multiple imperfections in 
the democracies that have been established in Latin America over the past 30 
years. Although there have been no cases of successful military coups (i.e., the 
takeover of political power by the armed forces) since Haiti in 1991, fully half 
of the region’s 20 countries have experienced removals of elected heads of state 
before the completion of their terms of office, in many cases by quite dubious 
extra-constitutional procedures. 
True, the armed forces no longer represent the authoritarian political threat 
dominating the region before the full transition to electoral democracy between 
1978 and 1990. In some countries, however, the military institution retains a 
high level of visibility and at times serves as an arbitrator during political crises. 
Another political issue revolves around continuismo, or efforts by civilian political 
leaders to change constitutions to allow immediate presidential re-election, often 
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successful. This raises once again the possibility of long-term domination by an 
individual head of state, hearkening back to the past specter of caudillo rule. 
An additional troubling development is the changing status of political parties. In 
many countries the traditional party system has lost its institutional capacity and 
has been supplanted by so-called “flash parties” or personalist political groups quite 
incapable of aggregating or representing societal interests in any lasting fashion. 
Such growing party incapacity has left civil society in numerous countries 
without an institutionalized channel to government. The result has often been 
the stimulation of social movements seeking to articulate the popular concerns 
that used to be the province of parties. In some cases, these supplant the party 
system in quite unpredictable and sometimes violent ways.
latin aMeriCa in the Global Context
At the broader global level, some Latin American countries, such as Brazil, have 
become important international actors which, along with some other emerging 
economies, appear to be in the process of replacing the former global economic 
power of the EU. With regard to the United States, economic relationships con-
tinue to be very important, but their northern neighbor’s political influence, so 
dominant during the 20th century, seems to be diminishing. 
After a clear convergence of interests in the aftermath of the transition to democ-
racy and the economic challenges of the 1980s, most Latin American countries are 
increasingly seeking to diver-
sify their external relationships 
and to establish their own 
sub-regional arrangements to 
achieve their national devel-
opment goals. Even though 
the region shares a common 
heritage, the national interests 
of individual countries and a 
variety of tensions between 
individual states—including land and ocean border disputes and “Indian nation” 
movements—make such collaborative initiatives problematic at best.
Given this panorama of risks and possibilities, Latin America needs to generate 
some fundamental changes. 
After a clear convergence of interests in the 
aftermath of the transition to democracy 
and the economic challenges of the 1980s, 
most Latin American countries are increas-
ingly seeking to diversify their external 
relationships and to establish their own 
sub-regional arrangements to achieve their 
national development goals.
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To resolve the region’s economic vulnerability due to its current reliance on eco-
nomic growth based on primary product exports, one necessary step is to open 
the primary sectors to foreign investment where it is now restricted. A second 
imperative is to ensure increased national value-added content to production, 
which would include technological and knowledge transfer to develop more 
specialized industries. 
It is also necessary to respond to the risks within the financial system, currently 
hidden by the primary product boom along with the higher levels of government 
income generated by taxes on the companies that are producing these commodi-
ties. Levels of worker productivity, although not a high government priority at 
this time given high commodity prices, also need to be increased. Latin America 
to date has not had significant increases in productivity as the result of improved 
labor skills or technological advancement.
The ongoing commitment to development, which will be based on primary 
products for some time to come, needs to be pursued in tandem with an 
environmental policy that is sensitive to the fact that the region’s advantageous 
natural resources position is subject to vulnerabilities that could become evident 
over the middle term. 
There are multiple sources of pressure to overexploit these resources, including 
ongoing population growth, continuing poverty and exclusion, marginalized 
indigenous populations, and internal migration flows to the cities. An effective 
state regulatory system and organized oversight by civil society are required to 
manage these tensions and pressures.
Continued reForMs are neCessary
In summary, to deal with these multiple challenges, government institutions 
need powerful tools at their disposal to manage natural resources, provide 
stabilization funds, control capital flows, and stimulate national integration. 
Governments also need to work with civil society organizations to tackle these 
problems together. In this manner, the multiple risks that Latin America will be 
facing over coming decades are more likely to be managed without provoking 
the crises and even system breakdowns that have too often occurred in the past.
In the political arena, electoral democracy has been in the process of deepening 
its relationship to society through citizen participation by virtue of being in place 
now for 20 years or more. However, it has often operated in ways that lack well-
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institutionalized channels or fully responsible local and regional organizations. 
Democratic governance will be able to increase to the degree to which state and 
non-state institutions are connected. 
Democracy will also benefit if public spaces are not exclusively or predomi-
nantly filled by the state but are arenas in which organizations generated by civil 
society can operate freely and openly. In such a dynamic, political parties may 
be able to reform themselves to become more representative and to overcome 
the legacies of caudillo and populist dominance.
As this overview has indicated, Latin America has tremendous opportunities 
going forward, made even greater if it can overcome its vulnerabilities with 
appropriate policies and reforms. Nevertheless, the region’s greatest limitation is 
the state itself. Latin American states, with few exceptions, are characterized by 
their fragility, their inefficiency, and their low level of institutional development. 
Even so, since the 1980s a number of state reforms have been attempted, and 
some, such as in judicial systems, decentralization initiatives, and poverty reduc-
tion programs, have achieved important successes. As a result, where reforms 
have taken place the judicial branch has become more autonomous, decentral-
ized government has increased the democratization of local society, and the 
delivery of the most highly demanded public services has improved. At the same 
time, there is still a need to further strengthen states’ constitutional and legal 
capacities, especially in the lower courts.
Unfortunately, too many of these reforms have been only partially carried out, 
stopped in mid-implementation, or distorted by deviating from their original 
objectives. The basic problem is that the reform policies themselves are not suf-
ficient because the structure of the state itself does not easily foster or permit the 
changes that have been proposed. Compounding the problem, Latin American 
states have had great difficulty in dealing with a number of major challenges 
affecting their populations. Although severity varies from country to country, 
the list is depressing: from street crime, drug production and trafficking, illegal 
immigration, and illegal depletion of natural resources, to money laundering, 
exploitation of children, and systemic corruption.
Our Task Force concluded that reform requires institutional changes, which have 
as their objective an improvement in state capacity to engage effectively with 
societal complexities. States themselves need to become more complex in order 
to participate efficiently within the increasingly complex national system of 
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which they are a part. The initiatives required to overcome the multiple chal-
lenges Latin America now faces demand a state that is structurally transformed. 
New or better economic institutions need to be established, along with a more 
efficient public administration, the reform of branches of central government, 
and of local and regional decentralized entities. Initiatives also require a solu-
tion to poverty rather than simply its reduction or maintenance at lower levels. 
Political party transformation must also be a high priority. In addition, inserting 
the region into an increasingly globalized world on more favorable terms also 
demands a more effective and efficient national state.
Domestically, the basic sense of such a transformation is that the state becomes 
progressively knitted together more fully with society, so that a permanent and 
growing interrelationship evolves between state and non-state institutions. Even 
though this relationship can blur the boundaries between “public” and “private,” 
it can help to ensure a more efficient and a more democratic state as well as a 
more engaged society.
A “smart state” that also includes a closely woven relationship between state 
and non-state actors can make a decisive contribution to democratic gover-
nance. Government through a reformed public administration should serve as 
a stimulus to institutional development as well. Even so, the state role would be 
more indirect in arenas where more social actors are involved in the formulation 
of public policy. Improved democratic governance is not equivalent to more gov-
ernment. It refers, rather, to state and non-state institutions with greater capaci-
ties to effectively meet national needs.
In order to confront the multiple challenges Latin America faces, new and better 
policies are required. However, new policies alone are not enough. The region’s 
generally weak, backward, and inefficient states are largely inheritances of cau-
dillo and populist traditions. Such a state in today’s complex world is incapable 
of formulating innovative policies. Reforms are required that get to the heart of 
the problem—the very structure of the state itself.
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Section I: Economic Growth and Development
1. latin america 2060: securing economic 
 development for the longer-range Future
Ann Helwege1
Latin America is growing, and growing fast. The question is whether it is 
developing, in the sense of securing the basis for sustained inclusive growth, 
or merely experiencing an upswing in its historically cyclical, natural resource 
dependent model. 
Few would assert that growth itself constitutes development, even if, arguably, 
growth makes good development policies feasible. True development must 
include opportunities for democratic participation, less vulnerability to natural, 
military and economic calamities, social inclusion of marginalized groups, sus-
tainable resource use and lifestyles that are healthy, productive, and pleasurable.
While it isn’t possible to measure progress precisely on these dimensions, we 
can assess income, education, maternal and infant mortality, violence, as well as 
inequality and poverty rates. With the exception of violence rates, Latin America 
is making progress. Every country in the region has seen infant mortality decline 
sharply in the past two decades (Table 1). Maternal mortality—arguably a greater 
1 I am grateful to Jonars Spielberg for valuable research assistance.
table 1. infant Mortality: rate per 1,000 live births
 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia
Costa 
Rica
Ecuador El Salvador
1990 25 84.3 46 18.3 28.1 15.8 41.3 48.2
2000 18.8 62.4 28.2 9.4 22.0 11.5 28.0 27.8
2009 13 39.7 17.3 7.0 16.2 9.6 20.4 14.6
Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
1990 57 43.2 36.4 51.5 34 62 20.5 26.5
2000 38.6 32.6 22.1 34.2 25.4 35.1 15.4 19.9
2009 32.6 25 14.7 21.8 19.4 19.4 11.3 15.3
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), 2010.
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challenge to public health systems—has fallen by similar magnitudes. Only rising 
violence fueled by drugs and gangs suggests a reversal of progress, and such 
activity is concentrated in a few northern countries (Table 2).
Other contributions to this volume address the extent to which the underpin-
nings of democracy—beyond elections—have been established. My concern is 
the extent to which longer-term economic stability has been achieved. Growth 
itself is helpful; avoiding the economic instability that characterized Latin 
America’s past is essential to securing its increased development by 2060.
are the CoMModity-driven booMs in south aMeriCa sustainable?
Latin American growth topped five percent in 2010, with growth in Brazil, Peru, 
and Argentina exceeding seven percent (See the IMF forecasts in Figure 1). This 
is not merely a rebound from the recession of 2009. Between 2004 and 2008, 
regional growth averaged four percent with several countries exceeding six 
percent. When one considers that regional growth in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 
2000s hovered around two percent, this resurgence is remarkable. 
A recent World Bank report attributes this success to: 1) Improved macroeco-
nomic policies, including strong currencies, countercyclical fiscal policies, and 
liquidity and capital provisions in banking regulation; 2) Better integration into 
global financial markets, involving less reliance on external debt “that exposed 
it to rollover risks, interest rates hikes, and sentiment changes, that could wreak 
havoc in its finances” and new flows of foreign investment; and 3) Diversification 
table 2. homicide rates, deaths per 100,000 residents
2000 2009
El Salvador 39 71
Honduras 51 67
Guatemala 26 46
Venezuela 33 49
Colombia 65 35
Brazil 26 20
Mexico 14 15
Argentina 7 5
Chile 6 4
Source: Organization of American States, Observatorio Interamericano de Seguridad,  
accessed 06/28/2011
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of its trade structures, which “desensitize it” to the economies of Europe, the 
United States, and Japan (World Bank 2010, October 6).
The World Bank is not alone in its enthusiasm for Latin America’s economic 
prospects. Brazil’s stock market has returned an average of 18.5 percent per 
year since 2005 despite the 2008 crash (Bloomberg, Bovespa Brazil São Paulo 
Stock Exchange Index). This is compared to a loss of 0.5 percent per year in 
the S&P 500 over the same period. Such sustained growth can create jobs and 
reduce overall rates of poverty. Indeed, poverty rates fell throughout the region 
between 2000 and 2007 (Table 3). If the optimists are right, Latin America is well 
on its way to becoming “developed” by 2060. However, there are reasons to be 
concerned about the sustainability of rapid growth in South America, and the 
prospects for even modest growth in Central America (Mexico is on a distinctly 
different trajectory, to be discussed later).
Despite refrains that “this time is different,” a commodity boom is evident 
throughout South America. Much of the macroeconomic dynamism is concen-
trated in the export sector, and much of that growth is attributable to higher 
commodity prices rather than output (although production has increased). The 
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Figure 1. GdP Growth Forecasts for 2010 and 2011 
selected latin american Countries
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 2010
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exports that have fueled the region’s boom (Table 4) are volatile primary com-
modities, including copper, gold, iron, soy, and oil. Table 5 presents trends in 
prices of minerals: all have more than doubled in the past decade. Soybean 
prices alone have doubled since 2005 (Figure 2), and oil prices are more than 
twice what they were a decade ago in real terms. 
Additionally, China’s imports into the region have fueled commodity demand 
and confidence. Between 2000 and 2008, trade between China and Latin 
America grew at an annual rate of 31 percent, almost all of it in the Southern 
Cone (Inter-American Development Bank 2010). China’s growth could give rise to 
table 4. exports of Goods and services 2004–2007 (% annual Growth)
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela 
9.5 9.7 9.0 7.5 9.1 8.9 8.8 9.4 9.2 13.9 1.6
Source: World Bank, WDI/Global Development Finance (GDF), 2010
table 3. Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day  
(Purchasing Power Parity—PPP, % of Population)
Country Name 2002–2003 2006–2007
Argentina 19.7 7.34
Bolivia 34.2 21.9
Brazil 21.5 14.6
Chile 5.34 2.38
Colombia 26.3 27.9
Costa Rica 11.5 4.25
Dominican Republic 16.3 12.9
Ecuador 22.4 12.8
El Salvador 24.5 13.2
Guatemala 29.8 24.3
Honduras 33.4 29.7
Mexico 13.1 4.79
Panama 20 17.9
Paraguay 28.1 14.2
Peru 24.4 18.2
Venezuela, RB 31.7 10.2
Source: World Bank, WDI, 2010
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a “super-cycle,” a decades-long commodity boom. If so, Latin America will have 
the luxury of financing better schools, housing, roads, ports, and parks.
But China’s rapid rise has also created supply bottlenecks that are likely to be 
relieved over time, leading to lower prices. A decline in gold and copper prices to 
half of the 2009 level—a return to healthy 2005 prices—would reduce Peru’s exports 
by nearly a third. Global reserves of iron and copper are massive, particularly if 
recyclable stocks are included. While Brazil is home to Vale, the world’s largest 
iron ore firm, the country produces just 15 percent of global iron ore, compared 
to nearly half of global output in China itself. Moreover, China has aggressively 
invested in Africa, where cheap production may finally take off in the next decade. 
table 5. Mineral export Prices, 2001–2009 
index, 2001=100
2001 2005 2007 Dec-09
Copper 100 231 428 424
Tin 100 175 351 380
Gold 100 164 258 417
Silver 100 166 304 405
Iron 100 175 206 218
Source:  Baca et al., 2010
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Figure 2. soybean Prices, brazil ($/Mt)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Database, 2010
14   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  September 2011
Similarly, soybeans are produced in many highly efficient developed countries. 
The United States, whose folly in diverting land to corn-ethanol is close to an 
end, may compete fiercely with Brazil and Argentina as the dollar weakens. U.S. 
soybean output, one-and-a-half times that of Brazil’s, grew faster than South-
ern Cone output from 2006 to 2010. Monsanto and Brazil’s Embrapa have also 
developed seeds and strategies to enhance the productivity of soy farming on 
marginal lands throughout the tropics. Even if China’s demand for grain-fed meat 
continues to grow, prices may well return to historical trends. 
The fluctuating price of oil reflects such factors as efforts to reduce carbon emis-
sions through efficiency, the growth of competing energy sources (e.g., nuclear 
power, wind, and natural gas), perceived supply gluts from new discoveries, and 
OPEC policies. Brazil, with its massive Tupi and Libra fields, is poised to become 
one of the world’s largest oil producers. Former president Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva described this new resource as “the opening of a direct bridge between 
natural wealth and the eradication of poverty,” a feat previously anticipated by 
Mexico in 1976. Yet the difficulty of accessing this oil, 18,000 feet beneath sea 
level, means large scale production will likely not occur for another decade. 
Should it succeed, its impact on other energy producers—Venezuela and Ecua-
dor in particular—will not be favorable. 
High commodity prices have undermined the competitiveness of other sec-
tors, a classic case of Dutch disease. Foreign capital has been drawn into the 
region to pursue both commodities and currencies, exacerbating exchange rate 
appreciation (Table 6). In truth, Latin America has been unable to compete with 
table 6. real exchange rates, 2000–2009 
(per us dollar, 2005 base year)
2002 2005 2008 2009
Argentina 3.66 2.90 2.64 2.93
Bolivia 7.29 8.08 6.18 5.78
Brazil 3.52 2.43 1.77 1.84
Chile 679 560 491 517
Colombia 2,749 2,321 1,842 1,939
Peru 3.45 3.27 3.02 2.73
Uruguay 26.71 24.48 18.61 18.66
Venezuela 1.98 2.09 1.33 1.03
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, 2010
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Asia in assembly work for years; in addition, corruption—another element in the 
“natural resource curse”—seems to have worsened. South America’s lack of broad 
trade competitiveness is evident in its current account deficits. The IMF forecasts 
substantial deficits in 2010 for every country (except Argentina, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela) even as it proclaims that Latin America is “advancing with strength” 
(International Monetary Fund October 2010, 79).
inFluential FaCtors in latin aMeriCan develoPMent
The Real Role of Commodities: Optimists arguably overstate the role of China, 
as well as the demand for commodities themselves, in the Latin American 
boom, and underestimate the importance of global liquidity. Low U.S. interest 
rates, a weakening dollar, excess savings in China, and soft European growth 
have fueled capital flow to emerging markets. Gold prices, in particular, reflect 
fears of U.S. inflation and global banking failures, as well as uncertainty about 
currency re-alignments as global economic power shifts. Gold, which is used 
almost exclusively for jewelry, is most likely in a speculative bubble as a hedge 
against continuing economic uncertainty. It is also Peru’s largest export.
A loss of growth can hurt Latin America’s development as a downturn in foreign 
investment cools aggregate demand. Investment, aimed at increasing produc-
tion capacity or capturing rising equity values, is the leading edge of a softening 
business cycle. And the financial unwinding of excessive optimism has hurt the 
region before. 
The relatively low risk premium on Latin American bonds reflects both confi-
dence in the current generation of finance ministers and a lack of good invest-
ment alternatives in the North. A similar phenomenon occurred in the 1970s 
with petrodollar recycling. A very substantial difference is that external debt is 
far smaller as a share of GDP (Table 7). 
National and Private Debt: Despite lower dollar-denominated debt, and a far 
healthier financial profile than in the past, recovery of the U.S. economy and higher 
table 7.  external debt as a Percent of GdP
Argentina Brazil Colombia Ecuador Honduras Mexico Peru
2004 74.1% 13.1% 21.9% 36.0% 53.2% 11.0% 35.2%
2006 27.1% 6.9% 15.6% 26.4% 33.9% 7.4% 25.4%
2009 17.6% 4.2% 14.1% 15.1% 16.1% 9.4% 16.3%
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Latin American and Caribbean Macro Watch, 2010
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interest rates could make it harder to finance deficits in local currency (Brazil’s pub-
lic debt in 2009 was 43 percent of GDP, almost entirely in local currency). Domestic 
debt is not immune to speculative attack. A loss of confidence in Latin American 
economies can trigger sales of domestically denominated debt, capital flight, and 
a currency collapse. This scenario was starkly demonstrated during Mexico’s peso 
crisis as Cetes bonds lost favor in the course of a few months.
Eliminating risk in the private financial sector is also challenging. Although 
banking regulation in Latin America is better than ever, it is difficult for regu-
lators to assess risk and enforce reserve requirements during a boom, as the 
evidence points to strong balance sheets until the bubble bursts. 
Tax Reform: Absent a commodity boom, the capacity to engage in counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy is hampered by the region’s long-standing failure to engage in tax 
reforms. Government balances remain beholden to non-tax revenue. Peru, for 
example, depended on minerals for 11 percent of its revenue in 2009, compared 
to four percent in 2002 (Baca, Ávila, Muñoz 2010). Tax revenues represent only 
16 percent of GDP in Latin America, compared to 35 percent in OECD countries, 
as volatile commodities are relied upon for non-tax revenue (Dayton-Johnson 
2008, 1–2). Tax structures ought to be reformed to capture a wider base, but as 
Baca et al. (2010) argue in the case of Peru, it is difficult to do so:
The rapid rise in taxes of these industries—that originates in the extraor-
dinary rise of prices of minerals and oil—generates an optical illusion: 
tax pressure has passed from 13 percent to 16 percent of the GDP with 
no effort by SUNAT, thus the idea of a tax reform has vanished from the 
public agenda …[C]orporate groups have begun to suggest a reduction of 
income tax rates, the elimination of the ITF (tax to financial transactions), 
among others, which to us seem unacceptable. 
And even though Brazil’s tax base is far broader than Peru’s and twice the share 
of GDP compared to other countries in the region, its deficits are also larger as a 
share of GDP.
The Middle Class: Since 1998, Latin America’s middle class in six countries—
those rich enough to have savings but not financially savvy enough to move 
money abroad—has lost its savings due to banking failures and appropriation 
by bankrupt regimes. Argentina’s cacerolazo in the wake of the 2001 currency 
board collapse is a classic example. Overall, the region is still in far better shape 
than it was a decade ago—and worlds apart from the chaotic inflation of the 
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early 1990s—but perhaps the middle class should not put its pots back in the 
cupboard just yet. 
The points discussed above are not intended to forecast trouble, but to identify 
vulnerability that warrants attention to secure long-term growth. A confluence of 
factors has fueled growth in South America: China’s rapid economic expansion, 
low global interest rates, uncertainty about OECD growth and currencies, and 
an influx of capital directed at commodities. Notably absent are fundamental 
improvements in productivity driven by skills and technological advancement, 
although new wealth has financed improved infrastructure. The main result has 
been a case of Dutch disease: currency appreciation, biased investment, and 
fiscal dependence on commodity revenues. Perhaps those who benefit from 
this boom will not see it collapse in their lifetime, but the factors behind growth 
seem unlikely to endure for many decades. 
even iF Feasible, is natural resourCe dePendenCe the riGht 
develoPMent strateGy?
There are reasons to ask whether the current model is a good development 
strategy, even if it is durable. Does it improve lives and increase opportunities 
for most citizens? Much of the export growth has happened in capital-intensive 
sectors that create few jobs for the region’s unskilled labor force. 
For ordinary Latin Americans, most of whom are quite poor, the boom has had 
mixed effects. The urban poor have benefited from improvements in infrastruc-
ture and generous welfare payments. Poverty rates are sharply down in urban 
areas. There are jobs for unskilled workers in the private and public sector, 
particularly in construction and services.
Government spending on housing, sanitation, and police has vastly improved 
the quality of life in urban favelas and shantytowns. Generous welfare payments 
through conditional cash transfers like Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, Chile’s Solidario, 
Colombia’s Familias en Acción, and Mexico’s Oportunidades now serve 93 
million Latin Americans providing support that few experienced before 1998 
(United Nations 2010). Less hopefully, this figure suggests that a substantial share 
of Latin Americans have been unable to secure their own means of improving 
standards of living.
Inclusion of the rural poor has been more elusive. Rural poverty rates remain far 
higher than urban rates, despite the boom in agriculture and mining (Table 8). 
18   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  September 2011
Some of the poorest geographic regions have been left out of the boom  altogether. 
In Peru, much of the agricultural expansion has occurred among mid to large 
growers of fruit and vegetables along the coast, while Andean mining communi-
ties remain mired in poverty despite generating more than half of the country’s 
exports. The Northeast of Brazil actually saw a slight decrease in agricultural 
income that has been compensated for by social transfers (Table 9).
This is partly because modern agriculture and surface mining involve rela-
tively little labor. The number of jobs in Brazilian soy cultivation fell from 
741,000 in 1996 to 335,000 in 2004 despite rising output (Pérez, Schlesinger, 
and Wise 2008). A joint Food and Agricultural Organization/United Nations 
(FAO/UN) study of 10 Latin American countries concluded that despite rising 
productivity, rural wages have failed to increase throughout the region  
(Da Silva, Gomez, and Castañeda 2010). Mining—an even more capital-inten-
sive activity—not only fails to create jobs, but also destroys land and water-
ways that support subsistence farmers.
The prospects for occupational mobility are not much brighter as we look ahead. 
Education rates for adults are low for a middle-income region, a problem that 
table 8. urban and rural Poverty rates ($2.50 usd)  
Percent of Population
Urban Rural
Brazil 
2004 21.4 42.2
2008 12.7 30.8
Ecuador   
2004 20.2 46.0
2008 12.6 33.2
Mexico
2004 9.4 33.7
2008 8.8 32.2
Peru
2004 8.8 50.9
2008 5.1 40.2
Source: Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean  
(CEDLAS and The World Bank), November 2010
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can only be solved in the longer term. Brazilians over age 25 have an average 
of 6.67 years of schooling—barely a primary school education—and less than 12 
percent of the population has completed high school (Guilhoto 2010). Among 
poor Mexican heads of household in 2004, 89 percent had no more than a 
primary school education. In rural areas, the disadvantages are even greater. Few 
poor workers will be able to transcend the gaps in skill needed to compete in a 
capital-intensive export sector. 
Policymakers are well aware that low education levels hinder growth. Spend-
ing on education has long been generous in Latin America, but the quality of 
schooling is poor, and illiteracy among parents poses challenges to what can be 
accomplished with the current cohort of students. 
table 9. brazil: Composition of household income by region (2006 constant r$)
Source of income Northeast Southeast South Central East
 95–96 05–06 95–96 05–06 95–96 05–06 95–96 05–06
Income per 
capita 117 135 225 278 247 341 244 306
Agricultural income
Average 48 46 101 93 122 156 136 155
Share of total 
income 0.41 0.34 0.45 0.34 0.49 0.46 0.56 0.51
Non-agricultural income
Average 41 35 93 115 84 101 83 98
Share of total 
income 0.35 0.26 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.32
Social security and pensions
Average 26 41 26 57 34 71 18 39
Share of total 
income 0.22 0.30 0.12 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.13
Other income
Average 3 13 6 13 7 14 7 14
Share of total 
income 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
Source: Da Silva et al. 2010
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a brieF CoMMent on MexiCo and Central aMeriCa 
Mexico and Central America have not experienced the same growth as South 
America, and there is uneven progress in implementing policies to secure long-
term growth. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua have suffered 
from poor governance and an economic model that relies too heavily on the 
export of labor. Remittances account for a share of GDP comparable to that 
of exports in South America (Table 10), yet the growth of remittances slowed 
sharply after 2007. The agricultural value-added sector has barely grown: in 
Nicaragua it grew by a mere 0.7 percent per year between 1990 and 2007. Ris-
ing coffee prices—today’s short-term hope—repeatedly proved unsustainable in 
the 20th century. The belated pursuit of gold is likely to prove environmentally 
unwise and unprofitable, particularly if it exacerbates social tension. Given the 
poverty that prevails in these countries, external support for training, education, 
infrastructure, public security, and trade promotion is essential.   
Mexico, the subject of much derision as a failed state, actually has a more diver-
sified economy than many South American countries. Its manufacturing sector is 
integrated with the United States (for better and for worse) and much of what it 
produces involves medium-skilled labor. The challenge is to support small farm-
ers in the South, to improve the quality of education, and to stem violence to 
maintain foreign investment. It has chosen a different master—the rich aging U.S. 
economy over the vast rising Chinese market—but its proximity to the United 
States may justify this.  
The current commodity-driven boom in South America has provided much 
needed hope for a region that has endured three difficult decades. As the region 
looks to 2060, it must secure itself against cyclical fluctuations and create new 
job opportunities for its people. Latin America’s enduring wealth is in its human 
capabilities, not the minerals beneath its earth or in the crops produced by 
mechanized agriculture.
table 10. remittances, % of GdP, 2009
El Salvador 15.7%
Guatemala 9.8%
Honduras 19.3%
Nicaragua 10.3%
Source: World Bank, Migration and Remittances Data, 2010
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2. international integration and economic Growth  
in latin american Countries
Ramón Espinasa
Within the global economy, the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region 
is becoming increasingly specialized in the provision of primary goods with 
varying degrees of value added along the energy, mineral, and food chains. The 
evidence of the last few decades shows a quantum leap in exports with a grow-
ing concentration of exports in primary goods and their manufactures. There has 
been a noticeable growth in the number of new products downstream of raw 
natural resources and commodities.  
Evidence from the Andean Countries shows exports increasing fourfold in real 
terms between 1984 and 2004 (Espinasa 2006). In the same period, the con-
centration of exports of the first 15 products increased from 65 percent to 85 
percent. Primary sector related products—raw materials and their manufactures 
—remained around 96 percent in the first 15. There has been a homogenous 
increase in the number of new products produced in clusters downstream of the 
raw materials in different countries (Manzano 2006). A similar phenomenon can 
be observed in countries such as Chile, Argentina, and Brazil.
The evolution of LAC exports is a consequence of the recent dynamics of world 
trade, particularly the integration of China and the rest of Asia into world produc-
tion and trade. The LAC cannot compete with the Asian countries on the basis 
of cheap labor, as witnessed 
by the demise of the maquila 
industry in Mexico and 
Central America. On the 
other hand, the fast growth 
of manufacturing in Asia 
has put additional pressure 
on the demand for raw materials, seen in the upward pressure on the prices of 
primary goods over the last decade. Exponentially growing prices for commodi-
ties and primary goods fueled by world economic growth between 2002 and 2008 
The evolution of LAC exports is a conse-
quence of the recent dynamics of world 
trade, particularly the integration of China 
and the rest of Asia into world production 
and trade.
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prefigures aspects of Malthusian boundaries to growth in decades to come. In this 
context, LAC has a comparative advantage, given that its vast endowment of natu-
ral resources will increase over time. It is possible to devise an economic growth 
strategy on the basis of the exploitation of natural resources for decades to come. 
laC CoMParative advantaGe and Growth strateGy
Shifting ownership: The primary sectors with the highest potential for growth, 
particularly in mining and energy intensive industries, are characterized by 
being high capital and technology intensive and low labor intensive. The 
development of these sectors, however, is defined by state ownership of the 
natural resource and high rents over and above production costs. These rents are 
a source of large revenues for government with well-known macroeconomic con-
sequences that may hamper the development of other productive sectors. Devel-
opment of primary sectors can engender high revenues with very little employ-
ment. Increasing the national content in the production of primary goods, be 
it through the supply chain of goods and services required upstream or adding 
national value downstream in the processing industry, is the main challenge of a 
growth strategy based on the exploitation of natural resources where LAC has an 
international comparative advantage.
In most cases, the specialized technologies and large investments needed for 
the development of primary industries require opening these sectors to foreign 
investment. Unless there is a deliberate policy to integrate these industries into 
the national economy, the development of primary sectors may be concentrated 
in enclaves with foreign personnel, equipment, and productive inputs. The same 
can be said of primary sectors developed by national operators; national owner-
ship of productive capital does not automatically secure integration into the 
national economy. The development of primary sectors can increase revenue but 
have a limited impact with respect to employment and national wealth creation.
State ownership of natural resources requires operators contracting with the gov-
ernment to have access to the mines and natural reserves. This opens a window 
for policies oriented to maximize growth impact in two respects: maximize the 
national content in the production of the primary goods and secure the trans-
fer of technology and knowledge for the development of specialized national 
industries. Thus a strategy can be implemented to maximize the national impact 
of the development of primary industries. As part of the concessionary contracts, 
clauses can be included to reward larger national content in terms of labor as 
well as goods and services produced locally. The training of the local labor force 
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and the ordered transfer of technologies can be part of the negotiations leading 
to the concession of mines, public lands for agricultural purposes, or oil/gas-
bearing lands. 
Conditional open markets: The implementation of such a strategy requires 
not only agreement between the state and the operators, but also between the 
operators and national firms that can be suppliers of goods and services. The 
condition in the procurement policy requires national companies to be ready 
to engage with operators in a long-lasting relationship. These companies would 
then be the national recipients of sustainable skills and knowledge.
The same process can be implemented with regard to the development of 
industries downstream of the primary sectors. Concessions for the production 
of raw materials can be conditioned to the establishment of processing plants 
along the value chain in order to add value in the country. Thus the “population” 
of neighboring industries, both suppliers of goods and services and downstream 
of the primary goods, can be facilitated by active policies by the resource owner 
state (Hausmann, Rodrik 2003, 603–633).
Opening primary sectors to foreign investment applies not only to new sectors but 
also to long-established ones that have been expropriated and monopolized by 
state-owned industries. In most cases such state control has hindered the develop-
ment of these sectors by limiting access to capital, technology, and know-how. 
Recent experience shows how the successful performance of the oil and gas sectors 
in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, or Peru is related to institutional reforms. 
Opening these industries to direct foreign investment and competition brought 
access to fresh capital, new technologies, and additional engineering capacity. The 
counterexample would be the dismal performance of the oil industry in the coun-
tries with the largest reserves in the region such as Venezuela, Mexico, or Ecuador, 
all run by state-owned monopolies lacking such capabilities (Espinasa 2008).    
There are a number of countries in LAC that are overcoming “barriers, with deep 
historical roots, to technological adoption and innovation” (Maloney 2002, 111). 
They are prepared to take advantage of the opportunity to grow and diversify by 
pursuing a strategy of resource-based growth following the successful example of 
countries like Australia, Canada, or the Scandinavian nations.
Industrializing strategy: The industrializing strategy associated with the open-
ing of primary sectors can vary depending on the characteristics of each country. 
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For example, the conditionality of the very successful opening of the Norwegian 
oil sector was on technology transfer (Noreng 2004). This made sense given the 
very small size of the Norwegian labor force where employment was not an 
issue. In response to its own context at present, Brazil is implementing a strategy 
to increase local content with emphasis on good quality employment under the 
guidelines of the National Oil and Gas Mobilization Program (Prominp) program 
(Prominp 2008).
A success story in state intervention to induce the transfer of technologies and 
diversification is that of Norway. In the words of Øystein Noreng (2004): 
In Norway, both the state and the market have had a role in the policy 
of economic diversification in relation to petroleum. One key lesson is 
that market forces alone never would have accomplished the transfer of 
competence, the successful establishment of supply and service indus-
tries…If left to market forces, oil companies would have had a preference 
for foreigners with a proven competence, established foreign suppliers 
of goods and services, often with a long-term symbiotic relationship with 
the oil industry…a long-term state strategy has worked out surprisingly 
well, based on a broad political consensus. 
LAC has space to grow in world trade as a supplier of primary goods and com-
modities. The development of these industries can generate large revenue with 
very little labor. The state has a role to play in order to maximize the national 
impact in terms of employment and wealth creation by inducing the vertical and 
horizontal integration of these industries. However, the implementation of such 
a growth strategy is complex and will depend on the quality and strength of the 
national institutions.
institutions For investMent and Growth in natural 
 resourCes 
There are at least four types of national institutions required for the success of 
a growth strategy based on the development of primary sectors: Institutions for 
natural resource development; institutions to promote national value added; 
institutions to secure property rights; and institutions for macroeconomic rev-
enue management.
Institutions for Natural Resource Development: State ownership of mines, oil/
gas-bearing lands, public lands for forestry and agriculture, and sea waters gives 
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the nation the right and the obligation to regulate the exploitation of natural 
resources. Typically, the two spheres of interest for state action have been the 
fulfillment of environmental and safety standards and maximizing rent from 
the development of natural resources. To the latter should be added the need to 
secure the greatest impact possible in terms of national value-added and growth 
effect along the lines outlined above.
Best international practices have shown that the state does not have to assume 
direct production in the primary sector to fulfill the national interest. The devel-
opment of natural resources can be done by private or public operators under 
the guidelines of a regulatory agency that administers the development of the 
natural resources on behalf of the owner state. 
This regulatory agency opens up mines and lands to a bidding process by 
private/public operators. Typically the bidding process includes the rent to be 
paid to the state as owner. Besides this basic parameter, the bidding process 
may also include, based on what has been outlined above, parameters such 
as national content goals, transfer of technology, training of the domestic 
labor force, and development of downstream industries. Government income 
per unit of product as the sole parameter can be replaced by such “softer” 
parameters as national value added and technology transfer. There is room 
for a negotiation process between the state and the operator to set up condi-
tions for the development of the natural resources beyond compensation for 
the raw material alone.
Institutions to Promote National Value Added: Best international practices 
provide examples of a second set of institutions oriented to design and help 
implement a strategy to maximize the national impact of the development of 
natural resources. These institutions exist to coordinate the action of the gov-
ernment and the private sector. They help in the process of “self-discovery” of 
industries with growth potential and exist over and above the national compa-
nies. One of the tasks of these institutions is to assess the gaps in the supply of 
national inputs required to maximize national content. These gaps may be in 
the provision of skilled labor force or in public infrastructure such as transporta-
tion and public utilities. Once the potential gaps are identified, these institutions 
work on devising and implementing strategies to strengthen national response.
An example of this kind of institution, Prominp in Brazil, has made a detailed 
assessment of the skilled labor force required by the expansion of the oil sector 
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over the medium term, how large a gap there is, and how to train the human 
resources required.
Institutions to Secure Property Rights: Contracting for investment in natural 
resources is particularly difficult for a number of reasons. Among them:
• Investment is asset specific; 
• It is made up front;
• It is very expensive by any measure; 
• The capital recovery periods are long;
• There are risks associated with the conditions of the resources in nature; 
• The presence of rents and their distribution is a permanent source of tension 
between the owner state and the operators; 
• A strong nationalistic feeling is associated with the development of natural 
resources (often generating a call from some political quarters for private com-
pany expropriation and state control of production). 
Such investment is risky compared to investment in manufacturing. With the 
addition of the natural tensions between the resource owner and the opera-
tor and so-called “rent nationalism,” potential investors will demand specific 
safeguards against the threat of expropriation. Without such guarantees, weak 
institutions and political risk will translate into low investments for a given 
endowment of reserves.
The geographic distribution of investment in the development of primary 
industries demonstrates that, just as the endowment of natural resources for 
investment is important, the 
institutional framework to 
minimize the possibility of 
expropriation is also crucial. 
For example, investment in 
the oil sector in the United 
States (as measured by the 
number of drilling rigs) is 
similar to investment in the rest of the world combined, but the United States 
holds only 2.1 percent of world oil reserves.
The geographic distribution of investment in 
the development of primary industries dem-
onstrates that, just as the endowment of natu-
ral resources for investment is important, 
the institutional framework to minimize the 
possibility of expropriation is also crucial.
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Institutions for Macroeconomic Revenue Management: The large rents pres-
ent in the production of most primary commodities and the wild fluctuations in 
such rents, given the volatility in the price of most commodities, are the source 
of permanent macroeconomic instability in countries specialized in primary 
exports. The rents received and spent by the state translate into real exchange 
rate appreciation and thus of real wages, thus hindering the development of sec-
tors that are more labor intensive (“Dutch disease”). 
Furthermore, real wage volatility makes investments in these industries riskier. 
Industries with lower margins include those that can develop as suppliers or 
downstream of the primary sector, thereby killing any strategy to create employ-
ment associated with the development of natural resources. Thus a successful 
growth strategy based on the development of primary sectors requires institu-
tions to save rents and/or regulate their flow; savings and stabilization mecha-
nisms are required. 
There are two main arguments for saving and regulating the flows of rents 
beyond the need to secure macroeconomic stability. First is the need to save at 
least part of the revenue out of the depletion of a national asset for future genera-
tions. The asset represented by the natural resource is monetized and trans-
formed into an investment asset that, if well administered, can yield revenue 
as high as that of the exploitation of the natural resource itself. This is the case 
at present of the Norwegian Petroleum Fund. Second, it is necessary to reduce 
macroeconomic instability to minimize animosity against the development 
of natural resources by sectors affected by the macroeconomic disturbances 
described above. Calls emanate from different quarters to halt production of 
commodities, not because of the production itself but because of the negative 
macroeconomic consequences of the rent present in their production.
ConClusions
The world division of labor and the comparative advantage of natural resources 
open the door for economic growth in the LAC countries for decades to come. 
However, the current trajectory is growth based on the production of high-
capital, low-labor primary goods that tend to generate high revenues with little 
employment. 
The capital and technology needed for fully developing these sectors requires 
opening them up to both national and foreign private operators. State owner-
ship of natural resources can be better used to negotiate concession contracts to 
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ensure transfer of technology and employment creation in the country. Employ-
ment in clusters to produce inputs and to process the primary goods may par-
tially offset the low employment ratio in the extractive industries themselves.
Such contracting is complex and requires solid and credible institutions to entice 
and manage the characteristics of investment in extractive industries associated 
with both natural conditions and the economics and politics of primary production. 
Effective institutions that can promote and secure investment in natural resource 
development are as important as the natural resource endowments themselves.
The main challenge for LAC is to create credible institutions, to attract invest-
ment, administer the natural resource, extract the wealth-creation potential of 
these sectors, and minimize their macroeconomic distortions. Only these steps 
will together ensure a positive growth strategy based on the exploitation of the 
vast endowment of natural resources in LAC in a world constrained by the sup-
ply of raw materials.
This proposal is just a small piece in the complex puzzle to devise a strategy for 
LAC economic growth in the long run; it is even smaller when put in the context 
of the challenges for institutional and political development. However, the LAC 
region risks being caught in a low-wage trap if it fails to take advantage of its 
natural resource endowment to attract investment and technology in ways that 
ensure creation and growth of good quality employment for its citizens in impor-
tant industry clusters. The trap might be related either to competition among 
other regions with lower salaries or because of a lack of dynamism and produc-
tivity in a closed economic system. Either way, LAC will move toward sustained 
development and prosperity only by avoiding the trap and creating the institu-
tional platforms needed to take the best advantage of its natural assets.
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Section II: Governance, Democracy, and the State
3. is latin american democracy Finally here to stay?
David Scott Palmer
Between 1978 and 1991, an unprecedented political transformation swept 
across Latin America—generalized electoral democracy. In a long-independent 
region in which the only political certainty was uncertainty, with instability or 
authoritarianism all too often the dominant modalities, the rapidity of the shift 
was as surprising as it was welcome. Almost 20 years have passed since the last 
true military coup (Haiti 1991–94); universal suffrage and regular elections are 
now routine events almost everywhere. Oppositions are now voted into office 
with regularity; every country in the region except Cuba has had at least one 
change of party in power, a sure sign of democratic routinization, if not consoli-
dation (Diamond 1999). 
Beginning in the 1990s, the oppositions elected have included a number of left 
parties and groups, from socialist or workers’ parties of long standing (e.g., Chile, 
Brazil), to both “top-down” and “bottom-up” populists (e.g., Venezuela, Bolivia), to 
former guerrilla forces (Uruguay and El Salvador) (Agüero 2003, Corrales 2009, 
Lehoucq 2008, Chávez 2004, Colburn 2009). This is a major achievement in a 
region that historically has had major difficulties in allowing new political actors 
to come to power through free and fair elections.
At the same time, however, democratic practice is still open to pressure from 
elite and civil society actors, as well as outside governments on occasion. The 
pressure stems from an informal and unpredictable accountability mechanism 
that has produced “interrupted” mandates of elected heads of state in half of the 
region’s 20 republics (Diamond 1999, 239–260). Other limitations are present as 
well. These include electoral devices that fail to ensure that all have access to the 
ballot and/or that votes have the same weight in determining electoral outcomes. 
They also involve a variety of executive branch-generated initiatives that limit 
opposition leader political participation, restrict media coverage, or allow previ-
ously prohibited consecutive terms, among others. So the democratic routinization 
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that has occurred is imperfect in multiple ways, even as it has been able to retain 
democratic practices and civilian rule via elections.
the Potential For lastinG deMoCraCies
The return to democracy and generalized universal suffrage took place at a 
time of severe economic stress, due in many cases to the multiple failures of the 
authoritarian regimes that previously dominated the region. Such national politi-
cal transformations while under economic duress increase the likelihood that 
democratic procedures will be sustained, for at least two reasons.
First, they suggest that the current democracies may have a greater ability to 
withstand future economic downturns without collapsing, as has happened 
so often in the past. Second, there is less possibility that military institu-
tions, generally chastened by their most recent long-term occupations of the 
seats of political power, will want to take over again. Most, in fact, have now 
accepted the principle of subordination to civilian control, a long-standing but 
elusive aspiration in the region in the past. In addition, the sustainability of 
these democratic forms is also likely to be reinforced by a worldwide pro-
democracy climate fostered by governments, international organizations, and 
regional bodies alike.
Nevertheless, there are a number of lingering areas of concern in any attempt 
to project contemporary positive political outcomes in Latin America over the 
next 50 years. One is the emergence of populist regimes in which elected heads 
of state progressively manipulate electoral mechanisms to ensure their continu-
ation in power (Carey 2003). Another is a growing tendency to change constitu-
tions in order to allow more than one successive term in office, which threatens 
to reintroduce presidential continuismo, historically a major political pattern in 
a region in which constitutions have granted greater powers to the executive 
branch than to the legislatures. 
A third is an erosion of established political parties and their ability to chan-
nel societal demands in an orderly fashion within national political systems in 
the context of rapid social mobilization and the generalized and multifaceted 
political expression it has generated within current “third wave” democracies 
(Peeler 2009, 169–173; Valenzuela  2004, 5–19; Pérez-Liñán 2007). Ad hoc politi-
cal groups have proliferated, competing with and often supplanting traditional 
parties, frequently serving as “flash parties,” or short-term electoral vehicles 
that virtually disappear after the vote. Their failure to become institutionalized 
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in most cases adds a disquieting lack of predictability to democratic practices, 
generating concerns over their long-term viability. 
A fourth, related concern is the proliferation of local protest groups with the 
generalized return or establishment of electoral democracy. These groups, often 
far from national political centers, make demands relating to such issues as 
water rights, environmental degradation, incursions into protected forests or 
indigenous preserves, or greater access to financial resources. In too many cases, 
central government authorities are either unable or unwilling to respond quickly 
or effectively to address them, often provoking confrontations and violence and 
eroding the political legitimacy of democracy itself in the process. 
Ironically, much of such local ferment can be attributed to the restoration of 
open democracy itself and the opportunities it presents for civil society to seek 
access and satisfaction of multiple pent-up needs and demands. This ongoing 
dynamic is reinforced by a variety of political decentralization initiatives that 
central government elected officials have carried out over the last 20 years. They 
include the establishment of elected regional governments, the provision of 
substantial resources to both regional and local political entities, and the addi-
tion of responsibilities for governance at these sub-national levels. As a result, 
new opportunities have been created for political involvement beyond the center 
and, in the short run at least, new challenges as local groups press for access to 
the resources and programs they offer (Montero and Samuel 2004).
A fifth challenge to democracies in the region that reemerged around the turn of 
the new century, dividing civil societies and political actors alike, is the ongoing 
debate in many countries over the best balance between the role of the state and 
that of the private sector in generating economic growth, alleviating poverty, and 
reducing income inequalities. Should the state be the principal engine of growth, 
as articulated in the post-Marxist slogan, “21st century socialism?” Or is the 
nation better served by the so-called “Washington Consensus,” with a market-
oriented economy and a state that facilitates private sector entrepreneurship and 
improves tax collection levels in order to accomplish growth and development 
objectives through more effective governance? 
While both international economic dynamics and the domestic market liberal-
ization initiatives that accompanied most transitions to democracy in the 1980s 
appear to favor the latter approach, some political elites, parties, and sub-
national groups press for greater state economic influence and control. A key 
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question is whether this emerging left-right divide can be channeled construc-
tively over time, through continued electoral alternation and moderate adjust-
ments within mutually acceptable parameters, or if it will deepen to produce 
political polarization, division, and conflict.         
iMPortant ConCerns GoinG Forward
Whatever the qualifications, which are numerous as the above summary discus-
sion suggests, by the early 21st century Latin America had unquestionably 
overcome the long-standing historic challenge of finding ways to put in place 
democratic procedures that 
can be sustained over time. 
The key question is whether 
the routinization of electoral 
democracy, with universal suf-
frage and respect for results, 
even when an opposition 
wins, can become fully consolidated over the coming decades. Various ongoing 
concerns muddy the waters, making any clear and definitive predictions uncer-
tain at best.
One such concern is a massive increase in criminal activity in recent years to 
such a degree that public opinion polls in many countries of the region note this 
as citizens’ number-one concern today. The often underpaid and undertrained 
police forces, especially in smaller countries, have been overwhelmed by the 
proliferation of petty criminals and organized gangs (Millett 2009). In addition, 
recent U.S. policy that now returns thousands of undocumented immigrants, 
often members of criminal gangs or presumed participants in illegal activities, to 
their home countries severely exacerbates the problem. 
Compounding the issue are weak civil law–based judicial systems which are 
underfunded, subordinate to the executive, and characterized by increasingly 
outdated procedures that are unable to keep up with the massive increases in 
caseloads. Even when apprehended, the accused too often languish for years in 
an antiquated and overcrowded prison system with minimal facilities, at best. 
Clearly, if a government is unable, for whatever reason, to protect the security of 
its people and to bring those accused of criminal behavior to justice in a rea-
sonable period of time, democratic formalities, however well established, ring 
hollow across civil society (Pinheiro 1996).
The key question is whether the routiniza-
tion of electoral democracy, with universal 
suffrage and respect for results, even when 
an opposition wins, can become fully con-
solidated over the coming decades.
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A second concern is widespread corruption. Although often alleged over the 
years, only since rough measures have been devised during the last decade or 
so has the magnitude of the problem captured popular attention. Transparency 
International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index rates all but three Latin American 
countries (Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica) as below or well below acceptable 
standards (Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results).
The democratic wave provides greater freedom to the media, making informa-
tion about corruption more widely available. In addition, the communications 
revolution stimulated by the internet gives citizens the ability to ferret out hitherto 
inaccessible materials. Thus, while popular indignation at abuses may be widely 
expressed and weaken the support for electoral democracies, the weaknesses in 
most judicial systems make prosecution of such abuses difficult to pursue, further 
fostering an aura of impunity for corrupt practices under democracy.
A third challenge to the sustainability of democratic practices over time is 
closely related to populism, an approach to governance that relies on the 
capacity of individual political leaders to impose their personal priorities on 
political procedures and practices (Peeler 2009, 225–228). Such leaders have 
been democratically elected after the traditional political parties and political 
elites that preceded them failed to respond effectively to popular demands and 
priorities. Once in office, however, they have tended to use their executive pow-
ers to manipulate democratic procedures in order to expand their authority and 
perpetuate their mandates, thereby undermining the democratic process that 
brought them to power in the first place (Roberts 2007). 
Historically, such populist regimes in the region have tended to overreach and 
have eventually either been forced from power or have collapsed under the 
weight of their own excesses. If history is any guide to contemporary populist 
dynamics, such regimes are likely, sooner or later, to suffer the same fate as their 
predecessors. The concern is that the legitimacy crises that are likely to provoke 
their demise could also include the democratic systems that brought them to 
power in the first place and cause their collapse as well.  
Other factors likely to affect the sustainability of democracy in the region and its 
full consolidation over the years include the role of individual countries and of 
regional actors. 
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Several key questions are relevant here:
• To what degree will the growing economic influence of China and Russia 
strengthen or weaken democratic institutions? 
• Will ties to Iran in the guise of “strategic alliances” compromise commitments 
to democratic procedures and practices? 
• Can the United States play a constructive role, or does its failure to respond to 
the 2009 democratic “interruption” in Honduras denote a loss of commitment 
to the principles of the Democratic Charter? 
• Will Venezuela’s use of petroleum resources to expand its influence through 
concessional oil prices and ALBA offer sufficient incentives to participants to 
sacrifice democratic practices for economic advantages? 
• Can Brazil use its diplomatic prowess and growing international stature to 
serve as a democracy-reinforcing regional counterweight to Venezuela through 
bilateral initiatives and such sub-regional organizations as UNASUR? 
How such questions are answered within the region will help determine whether 
or not the democratic transformation of Latin America over the past 30 years can 
be sustained for the next generation and beyond.    
Latin America 2060: Consolidation or Crisis?     35
4. reform of the state and democracy in latin america
Carlos Blanco
This analysis is based on a vision of the state as a complex system, structured 
in the form of networks and constellations in which states and non-state actors 
are intertwined. The rise of democratic governance in Latin America requires 
denser institutional networks and constellations whose growth depends more 
on autonomous dynamics than on government policies. Some of the key issues 
addressed here are reforms related to political parties, public administration, 
state power, the office of the presidency, and decentralization. These reforms 
should be integrated into a system characterized by its complexity and denser 
institutionalization, and should lead to what Riordan Roett has referred to as a 
“smart state.”
FroM FraGile to solid to Fluid states
The political analysis of Latin America concludes that most states in the region 
are fragile due to the weakness of their institutions; therefore, strengthening 
these institutions will contrib-
ute to a stronger and more 
robust state, with greater 
possibilities for implementing 
successful public policies. Cur-
rently, however, governance 
in these states is limited and 
in some cases compromised, 
and governments are very inefficient in service delivery as well as in their 
institutional and political leadership. Reforms have been proposed to decentral-
ize the state and to renew its institutions, but government and governance— 
conceptually distinct—remain weak (Rosenau 2007, 88–97).
Reforms fail because institutional changes have been sought through changes 
in organizations without considering the complex nature of the state structure. 
Reforms fail because institutional changes 
have been sought through changes in orga-
nizations without considering the complex 
nature of the state structure. Institutions are 
important but so are the networks in which 
they are embedded.
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Institutions are important but so are the networks in which they are embedded. 
The state consists of constellations of network structures, which evolve over time 
and whose nodes gain or lose density depending on their degree of interconnec-
tivity. Networks are not controllable at will and are difficult to line-up with public 
policies, except through indirect and often unexpected outcomes.
A series of layers surrounds all constellations. These layers come either from 
constitutional and legal arrangements, the formal system of norms, or from a 
variety of informal elements emanating from cultural standards prevailing in 
societies. Some constellations behave according to these standards and others 
violate them.
Constellations are neither at the “top” nor at the “bottom.” Rather, they are 
permanently changing their relative position within the state due to their 
interactions. Most notably, they are not state-dominated constellations limited 
to existence “inside” of the state, but are entangled with non-state networks in 
which multiple “private” agents participate.  
The real state action agents are mixed and complex constellations, autonomous 
to some degree, either participating primarily within the state, or both inside 
and outside the state. These constellations act as energy packets or political and 
institutional “quanta” reacting to the impacts produced by other constellations. 
They are self-organized and fairly fluid due to interactions with other social 
actors (Burnes 2005, 73–90)
The state, as a result of this political-institutional setting, is fluid, highly flexible and 
in permanent process of self-organization, with intricate systems of negotiation 
among the agents producing unpredictable and sometimes unmanageable results.
the role oF GovernMent
In the context of the state as a complex system, the government is also a constel-
lation, shaped simultaneously as a public-private network with constrained 
capacity for action. Paradoxically, the less complex states are, government 
interventions are more likely, but governance itself is lower. Whereas with more 
dense and complex constellations, the role of governments is limited but the 
governance of society is higher (as the processes of self-organization and adapta-
tion are more fully developed). Too much government can be a negative sign 
for a society and can reveal a much more fragile state characterized by lack of 
governance (Jessop 2005; World Bank: accessed October 30, 2010).
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When considering a highly complex state, public policy impacts different con-
stellations without necessarily reaching all desired components, and may set in 
motion unexpected response mechanisms. Results may not be manageable or 
controllable and may include unpredictable side effects (Duit and Galaz 2008, 
315–335). For this reason, policy making (i.e., a deliberate move to achieve a spe-
cific goal) is more limited in societies with more complex states (Archibugi 2003). 
Government’s role in these is to define objectives and to search for strategies that 
can affect state or parastatal constellations. Each constellation is a combination 
of state institutions, civil society actors, representatives of “special interests,” and 
information and communication systems. Government decisions may impact 
these constellations and impel their interactions, but without necessarily leading 
to the intended results.
Governance is the product of the interactions between the constellations. When 
institutional development is high, government may well be a high-quality, but 
not necessarily the most important, actor. Public policies end up as the outcomes 
of negotiations and conflicts among the constellations, depending on the “stocks” 
of power available to each one. As a result, equilibrium is dynamic and unpre-
dictable rather than static and predetermined.
In this context, change is an ongoing process among the constellations, and 
crises are produced by sudden imbalances amongst the interest groups, which 
are part of these constellations. They involve the media, business organizations, 
NGOs, and other formal and informal associations. Their critics often argue that 
they should be regulated or even eliminated. However, another way to affect 
their influence is to promote more, rather than fewer, such groups linked to dif-
ferent or conflicting interests. Such proliferation then becomes a mechanism of 
(self-) regulation within these constellation networks.
latin aMeriCa today
Since the 1980s, market-oriented reforms have been adopted without compro-
mising the important role of the state. Inflation and external debt have been 
overcome by most countries in the region. Other problems persist, however, but 
have been met with varying degrees of success. For example, poverty has fallen 
as a result of the economic recovery that began during 2002–2003, although it 
continues to be a serious problem, especially in rural areas.
However, the success of these economic reforms proved to be insufficient with-
out strong political and institutional reform. Several countries took important 
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initial steps in decentralization, judicial, public administration, and security 
and defense system reforms, but by the early 2000s these changes often either 
slowed or stopped. Some improvements became distorted, as with certain mani-
festations of a new centralism within the umbrella of decentralization. It is pos-
sible to identify three causes that have led reform to slow down or wither away:
1. Due to a lack of political will, leaders did not push for reforms that might have 
made them lose political power in the short term; 
2. The economic boom appears to have lessened the perceived urgency of major 
changes. Success in overcoming the economic crisis of the early 2000s and the 
sustained economic growth that followed dampened enthusiasm for change, 
just as efforts to counteract the effects of the crisis that began in 2008 did in 
the United States (Wagner 2002, 105–122);
3. We have seen a reemergence of popular protests in favor of maintaining the 
government’s central role as the main distributor of public resources, rather 
than favoring a more comprehensive role of the state as a whole.
However, within the framework presented above, it may be that the difficulties 
experienced when attempting reform have a more direct relationship to the 
weakness of state institutions. In the context of weak state networks and low-
intensity constellations, governments tend to become the most important actor, 
thereby inhibiting the potential cascade effects of networks. In Latin American 
regimes, which are characterized by strong presidential systems, government 
revolves around initiatives of the head of state—a post which often has limited 
powers to promote change but is very effective at stopping it.
latin aMeriCa’s ChallenGes
In developing a “smart state,” Latin America’s main challenge is how to go about 
adopting reforms that will produce an institutionally interconnected state capable 
of increasing democratic governance. Such governance will involve close interac-
tion between the public sector and private institutions to promote more intensive 
constellation building. In the context of our theoretical framework, the reform of 
the state entails the creation of more complex constellations, suggesting denser 
institutions able to fulfill their intended roles with close links to non-state networks. 
The following analysis of key institutions includes reform processes of network and 
constellation building. They assume a context of state and civil society fragmenta-
tion and offer a dynamic of recreation and interconnection of the fragments.
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Political Parties: Many mass political parties of the region have not been able 
to retain their once-dominant role and passionate popular support, even though 
several still have the votes to win elections. Examples include the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico, Argentina’s Peronist party, the Workers’ 
Party (PT) of Brazil, and Peru’s American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA).
Not only in Latin America but also throughout the world, modern political 
parties are changing. They are too often unable to aggregate interests in highly 
fragmented societies, so encounter major obstacles in promoting citizen partici-
pation and representation. One problem is significant popular disaffiliation from 
major parties. Another is the proliferation of opportunistic parties that are char-
acterized by loose ideology, personalism, and internal fragmentation. Moreover, 
there is a temptation to fill the political space created by the absence of effective 
parties with NGOs working on public administration and political affairs or with 
social protest groups.
Another development is the growing orientation of political parties towards mar-
ket policies for either ideological or pragmatic reasons. The interaction between 
economies, institutions, and networks contributes to such programmatic con-
vergence by parties. Combining a market economy with a state that has a strong 
social focus is the dominant vision of most Latin American leaders today, with 
only a few exceptions.
Differences between parties are becoming less ideological and more related to 
their degree of representativeness and their ability to promote participation. 
There is an overlap of political parties and civil society organizations in complex 
systems; this seems to characterize the future of Latin American political parties. 
Such a future requires parties to be more open to participation without rigid 
membership stipulations, to have greater ideological and programmatic flexibil-
ity, and to be more willing to engage in internal debate. In practical terms, this 
means establishing and developing associative networks that extend beyond the 
boundaries of traditional parties.
Horizontal networks-based organizations, able to assume fragmentation as a 
condition rather than a setback, interconnected with various social networks, 
decentralized and with high levels of autonomy in sub-national arenas, may be 
the destiny of Latin American political parties. 
Public Administration: Public administration (PA) is a complex system in its 
vertical and horizontal extension. In Latin America, PA is a set of institutional 
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arrangements that responds to demands of political parties and government 
leaders. PA posts are too often seen as a reward for supporters and for those who 
are able to control rather than perform. 
Autonomy may be the future of PA structures, guided by general principles 
designed to provide result-oriented, citizen-led strategy, with safeguards against 
corruption. The major control mechanisms may come from the interconnection 
with citizens, which will tend to keep the PA within more defined boundaries 
and will also at least partially be influenced in public space by non-state agents 
(Teisman and Klijn 2008, 287–297).
The creation of constellations of PA is more easily accomplished at regional and 
local levels, both of which are already highly intertwined with civil society. In 
these areas, the provision of services is linked to recipients’ ongoing assessments 
of the benefits they obtain. These recipients promote greater transparency and 
control, according to their interests, shifting the center of gravity from the supply 
of services to their demand.
The major reform of the PA—which will define its possible future—will be the 
expansion of networks in which citizens are involved in its design, as well as 
with its financing, monitoring, and evaluation. At some point this approach will 
partially transform public services into self-sufficient services, since specific state 
agencies are interconnected with the communities that support them. 
Heads of Government: Given the region’s political history of caudillo, or strong 
man rule, the presidency of the republic in contemporary Latin America is 
often perceived to be much more powerful than it actually is in practice. This is 
because most of today’s heirs of that nineteenth-century tradition are constrained 
by the array of special interests that made their rise to power possible. Neverthe-
less, these presidents try to maintain the illusion of power in the hope that they 
might be able to realize their electoral promises. So they utilize a communica-
tions system to renew and manage popular hopes and to give orders, but too 
often fail to produce the desired results because their outcome depends on fac-
tors beyond their control, such as sudden prosperity due to a favorable external 
economic environment (Heinrich, Lynn Jr., and Milward 2009, 3–19).
Reform should seek to replace the president with the presidency, where the dynam-
ics of exercising political power revolve around the institution rather than the indi-
vidual. The presidency demands complexity and requires an institutional system 
that is capable of understanding its limitations. This system is essential because it 
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recognizes that interventions are possible beyond the designation of a large number 
of PA officials, that they can only be strategic, and that they often have unintended 
consequences. In the tradi-
tional authoritarian regime, 
government was personalistic 
and unilateral. Presidential 
reform should move towards a 
more interconnected govern-
ment, with more limits on its specific arenas of activity, but also more effective in 
creating a cascade effect that is ultimately the secret of its power.
Non-Centralized Decentralization: Decentralization has been undertaken in 
Latin America as a “top-down” shift of functions. This two-dimensional view 
implies that what is “down” is always subordinate to what is “on top.” A reform-
ist approach implies both a multidimensional and a horizontal and vertical 
dynamic capable of creating autonomous decentralized networks that are not 
necessarily subordinate to the political center.
In too many cases, decentralization initiatives have involved the micro- reproduction 
of highly centralized upper levels at regional and local levels. Rather than 
achieving decentralization, this has created disseminated centralism. A real pro-
cess of decentralization should involve both a vertical and horizontal redistribu-
tion of power and institutions in which what is “on top” is neither permanent 
nor solid but depends on themes and forces in play at given moments.
ConClusions
Latin American countries were not able to achieve nation-states structured like 
those found in industrialized countries due to a combination of weak institutions 
and a legacy of caudillismo. It is too late to build nation-states with the same 
pattern as industrialized countries because globalization, the information and 
technology revolutions, and social fragmentation have unleashed forces that 
have created new realities. The complexity of societies is superimposed onto 
projects and leaders’ wills, paving the way for the emergence of new dynamics 
that no one, even highly regarded leaders, is able to control. What is required are 
reforms that generate cascade effects and the ability to act on the ripple effects 
they produce. In concrete terms this means that empowered societies have to 
grasp state constellations, embolden their institutions, and navigate them as 
malleable networks when changes emerge.
Reform should seek to replace the president 
with the presidency, where the dynamics of 
exercising political power revolve around 
the institution rather than the individual. 
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5. Can Judicial reform achieve a rule of law  
in latin america?
Silvia Inclán
To answer this question over a 50-year trajectory, we must examine the region’s 
experience with judicial reforms over the last two decades. Beginning in the 
late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Latin America engaged in a crusade to 
transform traditionally weak and subordinated judicial branches into strong, 
independent institutions. Those decades underwent a new democratic era in 
which supreme courts and constitutional tribunals needed to be empowered as 
counterweights to executive and legislative authority. In addition, the indepen-
dence and scope of action by courts and justices also required constitutional 
and legal protection to effectively enhance the rule of law. Finally, justice had to 
be accessible to all, so problems of access and efficiency had to be addressed 
through institutional and legal reforms.  
But have these goals been met? To what extent can judicial reforms affect the 
rule of law? Is it worth doing more of the same? What are the most important 
judicial challenges today? Do Latin American states have the constitutional and 
legal muscle to face their main threats over the coming decades? 
JudiCial indePendenCe
At the core of all judicial reform projects undertaken in the late 1980s and 
1990s was the objective of establishing or reestablishing judicial independence. 
The motivations for both domestic actors (reformers) and external agencies 
(donor and financing institutions) were twofold. One, they wanted to strengthen 
the historically weak and subordinated judiciaries in the context of the demo-
cratic wave which had swept the region as a necessary condition for democratic 
governance. Two, they saw the need to create or reinstate more autonomous 
judicial institutions to foster economic growth and development as well. The 
region’s judiciaries had to overcome their historical weakness and subordina-
tion to be able to provide meaningful political limits for executive and legisla-
tive branches. Only strong and independent judiciaries could protect property 
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rights and offer the legal assurances necessary to attract and secure creditors 
and investors.
Throughout the 1990s, judicial reform offered governing elites a means to distance 
themselves from their nations’ authoritarian pasts. In addition, a number of other 
political incentives for reform were present (Hirshl 2004; Ginsburg 2003; Finkel 
2008; Woods 2009; Hilbink 2009; Woods and Hilbink 2009; Erdos 2009; Shambayati 
and Kirdis 2009; Inclán 2009; 
Ruibal 2009), which would 
serve to increase the legitimacy 
of both courts and govern-
ments (Ginsburg and Moustafa 
2008). After the return to 
democracy in Latin America, 
the wave of reforms designed 
to enhance the independence and relative power of judicial branches is arguably 
the most significant change affecting political systems in the region. Through altera-
tions to the rules of appointment and career requirements for justices and judges, 
the creation of judicial councils, and enhanced constitutional review powers for new 
or existing constitutional tribunals (Inclán and Inclán 2005, 55–82), many judiciaries 
became relevant political actors for the first time in their countries’ history. 
Today, stronger and more independent judiciaries have been established in the 
region. We lack neatly comparable information of the justices’ and judges’ levels 
of independence for either supreme or lower courts before and after reforms at 
the regional level. However, case studies documenting the new and increased 
power of Latin American courts after reforms abound.1 Rather than trying to 
estimate levels of judicial independence, scholars today are studying the various 
roles being played by courts and judges in different countries.2 Increasingly as 
well, studies are also addressing the consequences or policy implications of the 
new constitutional review powers and are raising new concerns over the old 
question of judicial accountability and judicial review.3
1 Latin American courts are no longer an understudied institution, although not all countries have received equal 
academic attention. Kapiszewski and Taylor’s (2008) review of academic literature in English addressing the re-
gion’s courts reports that four-fifths focus on four countries (Argentina, 31%; Mexico, 18%; Brazil, 16%; and Chile, 
15%). The remaining fifth covers all the others.
2 For example, the Mexican Supreme Court devotes most of its time and attention to the resolution of political 
conflicts while Argentine and Colombian courts are ruling mostly on human rights issues.
3 A major focus is on cases in the surprisingly progressive courts of Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica (Kapiszewski 
and Taylor 2008:755–6).
After the return to democracy in Latin 
America, the wave of reforms designed to 
enhance the independence and relative 
power of judicial branches is arguably the 
most significant change affecting political 
systems in the region.
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From this data, it is clear that Latin American judiciaries have gained significant 
independence and power through reforms. The adoption of structural safeguards 
for judicial independence is certainly not complete, and it has not occurred with-
out ups and downs and significant delays in many cases over the past 20 years.4 
We also now know that democracies are more likely to produce judicial indepen-
dence than authoritarian governments, and that judicial independence is greater 
and has greater chances of surviving under divided rather than unified govern-
ments (Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009). Safeguards for judicial independence can 
be violated or ignored where political power is more concentrated, but strength-
ened judiciaries have certainly raised the political costs of doing so for elected 
officials. Although reforms are incomplete, the introduction of formal protections 
has begun to help to institutionalize judicial independence in the region.
ProPerty riGhts, develoPMent, and eConoMiC Growth
The question of whether the new judiciaries are doing a better job in terms of 
securing property rights and promoting economic growth and development has 
produced inconclusive empirical results in the economic development literature. 
Formal judicial independence has not been found not to correlate with eco-
nomic growth; however studies using indicators of de facto independence reach 
opposite results (Haggad, McIntyre, and Tiede 2008, 217). The current academic 
discussion on the validity of the link between judicial independence and the rule 
of law and growth and development has yet to find conclusive explanations as to 
when and how such positive dynamics are likely to occur. 
This is largely because of powerful counterexamples, such as China, and 
because measurements of judicial independence and the rule of law5 are still 
based on either formal provisions or on opinions of experts and users of justice 
services (as they were 20 years ago, before the reforms). Moreover, measure-
ments still tend to rely on information from supreme courts rather than lower 
courts, where most of the conflicts regarding property rights are solved (Haggad, 
4 For example, in El Salvador, the integration of a new supreme court took two years after the passing of the 
new mechanisms for justices’ appointments. Similarly, judicial councils were first formed with a two year delay 
in Paraguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic and with a four year delay in Bolivia and Argentina. The whole 
judiciary was put under the control of an executive committee in Peru for six years after the passing of reforms 
(Inclán and Inclán 2005). Supreme Court suspensions and sweeping renewals have also occurred, as in Ecuador 
between 2003 and 2005. In Venezuela, courts, justices and judges have been subject to renewed executive branch 
influence after earlier reforms. Even so, such delays and reversals are not as common in the region as they used to 
be (Verner 1984).
5 The current tendency not to base indicators of the rule of law solely on private property security but to break 
down the indicators should be strengthened to learn more about the roles of courts as limiting government author-
ity and as promoting economic, civil, and political rights and liberties.
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McIntyre, and Tiede 2008, 217). Finally, there is almost no information available 
about compliance with rulings.
aCCess to JustiCe
Another main objective of reforms was to enhance access to justice, particularly 
for marginalized populations. This included solving the common problem of 
overwhelming workloads of courts, the main cause of delays and inefficiencies 
in most systems. Since its beginnings in the 1980s in Central America, reform 
projects emphasized the introduction of accusatory criminal proceedings (ACRs) 
to replace Latin America’s traditional inquisitorial systems. The former are per-
ceived as more transparent, less prone to corruption, and more likely to arrive at 
objective justice given the integration of investigations by a single judge (Ham-
mergren 2008, 91). The introduction of ACRs required the formulation of new 
procedural codes and related laws, but also a major effort to train judges and 
officials at all levels, administrative improvements, and automation (which in 
turn requires more resources, from computers to forensic laboratories). 
The results of these efforts are mixed.6 On the one hand, Latin American judiciaries 
have grown in size and relative importance. In certain areas their total numbers are 
still lower, such as the number of judges and specialized courts, salary levels, career 
credentials, shares of national budgets, constitutional and legal protections, and fac-
ulties. Nevertheless, in each of these areas they are better equipped than they were 
20 years ago and are more internationally comparable as well. Workloads have also 
increased, suggesting the increased use of courts as channels for dispute resolution.7
However, many experiments with the adoption of ACRs and alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms (ADRs) show insufficient efforts to reeducate the sec-
tor’s staff to work according to the new procedural codes. In many cases, justice 
procurement continues to be carried out with traditional practices despite new 
legal provisions. Domestic and external participants have also noted the need to 
introduce monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. 
However, not all experiments intended to facilitate access to justice have disap-
pointing results. There are few successful national-level examples, but we can 
6 Evaluations in terms of access to justice and efficiency, particularly of results after the adoption of ACRs and 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADRs) for justice procurement cannot be made at the regional level, 
since these programs have so far not been part of all reforms and have been implemented at different levels in each 
country. The process of conversion continues in many nations.
7 See Centro de Estudios de Justicia de las Américas—CEJA (2010) for the best current summary of statistical 
indicators of Latin American judiciaries.
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find several cases of local level implementation which show encouraging results 
in terms of access, efficiency, and compensation. These were carried out after 
there had been a sufficient reeducation of the sector’s community.8
GrouP riGhts
A more recent trend transforming laws and justice procurement in the region 
is for the protection of group rights (Hammergren 2008, 89–104), particularly 
those of indigenous or traditionally marginalized poor groups in their fight 
for their communal rights, particularly property rights to land and resources. 
This time the reforms, which include the promotion of new versions of ADRs, 
education programs, and technical support mechanisms, are being devel-
oped with professional and financial support of nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), local groups of lawyers, civil society organizations, and both 
traditional and new external donor and financial actors. The movement is 
relatively new and is largely being carried out on a (legal) case-by-case basis 
(Anaya and Williams 2001). 
It should be noted, however, that the logic of such moves largely runs counter 
to that of promoting the protection of individual property rights, (Hammergren 
2008, 89–104), at least at face value. A discussion of the constitutional rights 
to property of land and resources, their use, exploitation, administration and 
particularly alienation in each country is an urgent challenge. Constitutional and 
legal clarifications are necessary to prevent this trend from moving into socially 
undesirable or unplanned directions.
ConClusions
Judicial reforms were certainly oversold by their promoters as “the means” to 
achieve the rule of law in Latin America. Clearly formal creation of strong and 
independent institutions does not automatically produce rule of law. Nevertheless, 
empirical evidence suggests that it is certainly necessary to continue establishing, 
reestablishing, or reinforcing judicial independence and strength with formal pro-
tections at all levels within judicial branches and justice procurement authorities. 
This is particularly important today with the growing problem of organized crime 
and its ability to capture important parts of the state, especially in the Tri-Border 
Region (Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil), Central America, and Mexico. 
8 Among successful cases are those with ACPs in Chile (Cooper 2008) and in the state of Chihuahua in Mexico 
(Zepeda 2008), those with individual constitutional writs (tutela in Colombia and amparos in Costa Rica), and with 
small claims courts in Brazil (Hammergren 2008:94-6).
48   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  September 2011
The independence and capacity of courts and justices need to be backed up 
with further safeguards to fight corrupt authorities at all levels across the three 
branches of government. These include increased constitutional and legal 
powers as well as the elimination of informal and formal obstacles (fueros and 
special legal regimes for certain public officials and private groups).
Increased institutional and legal capacity is also necessary to address the current 
challenges related to organized crime—its armed capacity, its economic power, 
and its ability to corrupt. Stronger judiciaries are also necessary to back up still 
pending fiscal reforms required for more effective tax collection and healthier 
revenue management systems. Over the next 50 years, the extractive capacity of 
states is one of the most important areas to be addressed. Future reforms should 
no longer be focused primarily on limiting executive and legislative power, but 
should turn more to strengthening the constitutional and legal leverage of the 
state vis-à-vis powerful groups currently able to circumvent the law.
Ongoing efforts to enhance access and efficiency in justice procurement will 
most likely include deeper case diagnosis, and monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms. Successful cases so far include conversions to ACPs and ADRs, 
as well as other mechanisms and procedures. Whether the entire region will 
convert to these is hard to tell at this point, but any such changes will require 
major educational efforts with significant domestic political will and long-term 
commitment. However they evolve, future reforms will have to address the dif-
ficult challenge of promoting greater transparency and publicity for the work of 
judicial branches and justice procurement authorities. 
One hopes the need for more detailed and specific diagnosis of cases will gener-
ate the production of systematized and comparable information at all levels 
for the whole region. There is still much room for improvement in information 
produced by supreme courts and constitutional tribunals, but a major effort is 
required for the systematization of information on rulings produced by lower 
courts and on reporting information about compliance (an essential component 
for adequate evaluations of reforms’ effects). Constitutional and legal reforms 
that target transparency and publicity are also among today’s main challenges. 
The reputation and legitimacy of judiciaries—and hence the power of the state to 
fully apply the law—would certainly benefit if public perceptions were based on 
statistical indicators, rather than on opinions, collective hearsay, or scandalous 
headlines in the media, as they are today. 
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6. how Can effective and sustainable Governance  
be achieved?
Enrique Saravia
Attempting to foretell the future is a permanent desire of humankind. The results 
are normally disappointing. This is why Keynes is frequently quoted when the 
talk is of forecasting: “In the long run we are all dead.” 
But governments and organizations, as well as families and individuals, need to 
be prepared for shortages of food and other vital elements for survival. In other 
words, they need to plan for the future.
Planning is also an essential element of politics and management and it requires 
imagining goals in the future. Those goals are considered in variable future contexts. 
And both—context and goals—could be considered as descriptive or prescriptive.
The question is how to distinguish real or plausible possibilities from wishful 
thinking, science fiction, or dreams. Yet, as history shows, many ideas from 
science fiction have become reality. The aim must then be not to limit dream-
ing, but to know what is possible to recover from dreams, or how to implement 
dreams, and, especially, what is required for being prepared—or, at least, for 
surviving in the future.
When reflecting on the changing elements and forces that shape life and 
institutions, it is possible to detect some permanent characteristics in human 
behavior. From the pre-Socratic philosophers to modern novels, movies, and 
intellectual research, some virtues and failings are always considered as driving 
forces for politics, strategies, and action: greed, hate, and envy on the one hand; 
solidarity, friendship, love, and compassion on the other. William Shakespeare 
was authoritative and conclusive in the description of all those human passions. 
Machiavelli described the manipulative nature of political behavior in a way 
that remains absolutely consistent over the centuries.
The first conclusion we can consider in any dynamic and changeable context is 
that human behavior will continue its patterns and must be considered as a driving 
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and decisive variable. Greed and envy, as well as solidarity and compassion, will 
maintain their influence in the actions of countries, corporations, and leaders.
sCenarios oF huMan behavior in latin aMeriCan Countries (laC)
Modern planning is increasingly reliant upon (and improving) the technique of 
scenario development. An interesting example was performed by the Brazilian 
National Development Bank in the late 1980s. The “Brazilian Scenarios for the 
Year 2000” studied the national characteristics and possible developments of 
Brazil in five areas: economic, political, social, international, and technological. 
It concluded with three possible scenarios: the maintenance of the status quo, 
a discrete growth and some variable changes, and the competitive integration 
of the country on the international stage. The effort, even though not highly 
regarded by politicians as an input in deliberations on public policies, was 
important in helping public and private organizations with their planning.
The scenario technique considers trends and tendencies as well as the possibil-
ity of unforeseen or unpredicted events. What I will attempt here is to identify 
some trends in recent Latin America politics and economics and try to imagine 
their possible development.
• First is the contradictory but dialectical dynamic affecting national and 
regional integration and fragmentation.
• Second is the particular way Latin America is integrated into global systems, 
especially into global government mechanisms.
• Third, related strongly to the previous tendency, is the growing common regu-
lation of activities and services.
• Fourth are the difficulties and contradictions in finding a satisfactory political 
system.
• Fifth is the political and economic strengthening of some countries and the 
parallel weakening of others, and
• Sixth is the consideration of the degree to which mechanisms of income con-
centration, growing regional unbalance, and social injustice and inequity are 
permanent characteristics.
Latin America as a whole shows profound differences between countries and 
even internally within them. Consequently the trends listed above need to be 
understood in the particular context of each nation.
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national and reGional FraGMentation and inteGration
Since the Congress of Panama, organized by Simon Bolivar in 1826, regional 
integration has been a permanent goal of Latin American countries.
After World War II, several attempts were made to achieve some degree of regional 
integration. In 1960, a group of countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 
established the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). After some 
achievements in improving trade among Latin American countries, LAFTA failed 
in its larger goal of establishing a free market. In 1980, it was replaced by the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA), which included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
In 1969, the Andean countries decided to accelerate the integration process 
and established the Andean Pact with the Cartagena Agreement (since 1996, 
the Andean Community of Nations). The integration process has suffered many 
problems, including Chile’s withdrawal in 1976 during the Pinochet government 
and Venezuela’s declaration of withdrawal in 2006. The Group is now reduced to 
four members.
Mercosur, the Southern common market established in 1991 by the Treaty of 
Asuncion, was more successful. Its four founding countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay) increased trade and negotiated many common rules to 
prepare a complete common market. Chile, Bolivia, and Peru are commercial 
partners of Mercosur, and Venezuela will become a full member after approval 
by the congress of Paraguay.
In 2008, the South American countries decided to establish a stronger union, 
called UNASUR—Union of South American Nations, including all the countries 
of Mercosur and the Andean Community plus Chile, Guyana, Suriname, and 
Venezuela. In December 2010, Uruguay became the ninth nation to ratify the 
UNASUR treaty, thus giving the union full legal status.
At the same time, however, several countries negotiated special agreements with 
third parties, as recent bilateral conventions with the United States illustrate. The 
formal relationship of the larger Latin American community with some countries 
changed as a consequence of those pacts (the best example being Mexico after 
the NAFTA agreement).
Despite these ongoing agreements, internal feuds have produced fragmentation 
in many Latin American countries since the times of Bolivar´s Panama Congress 
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almost 200 years ago. Several former Mexican provinces declared their indepen-
dence in the 1830s (Central America), Panama separated from Colombia, and 
Greater Colombia was divided into three national states (Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Ecuador). Mexico lost huge territories to the United States, and Haiti and the Domin-
ican Republic were unified for a time but then split apart again. Bolivia is today 
facing a separation threat, and Ecuador continues to cope with the strong rivalry 
between the coast and highlands. Every country has had border disputes—and even 
wars in some cases—over establishing permanent limits to their territories. Some of 
these disputes remain unresolved and are continuing sources of tension.
The activity of networks, enhanced by the Internet and other digital connec-
tions, could accelerate such fragmentation. Groups, regions, and individuals now 
connect and interact directly without crossing geographical borders. Another 
new problem is the recent establishment of “Indian Nations,” some of them in 
territories shared by two or more countries. All of these challenges demonstrate 
the historical difficulties in establishing common goals and mechanisms oriented 
toward sharing benefits and resolving conflicts. The reasons for such divisive 
tendencies are deeply embedded and will continue to pose significant obstacles 
to the establishment of common institutions. 
inteGration to Globalized systeMs and Global  
GovernMent MeChanisMs
Globalization could be understood at three different levels: economic, cultural, 
and legal. The first, and the most frequently considered when speaking about 
internationalization of social systems, is the field of economy and finance: cur-
rencies, stock exchanges, banking, trade, production, prices, and other related 
systems, as well as corporations’ internal and external activities. The second is 
the arena of culture, arts, communication, and social practices: values, customs, 
traditions, rituals, and music, movies, television, Internet and other media, 
among other social practices. The third level is the rapidly growing supra-
national institutional legal system that is progressively displacing the historical 
concept of unlimited national sovereignty. Nowadays it is hard to imagine a 
national public policy that is not conditioned to international agreements or 
norms, or in some sense shaped by international organizations’ activities. In 
addition, there are growing numbers of integration agreements and treaties that 
strongly associate several countries and modify their internal legislation.
If we look at the links between Latin American countries and the rest of the 
world, we will see strong interlinkage at all three levels of globalization. Conse-
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quently, it will be very difficult in the future to separate the region´s realities from 
the global systems. They are profoundly intertwined.
The possibility and necessity of global governance in many aspects of eco-
nomic and political life will orient the world to common mechanisms of policy 
and rule making. Most likely, those mechanisms will gather together not only 
national states but also civil society organizations—especially those acting 
internationally—as well as large corporations, international organizations, and 
others. The rise of multilevel public policies is an unambiguous symptom of this 
new reality. 
A review of the so-called Heiligendamm process, the negotiation and associa-
tion of the G8 and the G51 countries later absorbed by the G202, illustrates the 
new global trend. The European Union is already an individual member of G20. 
It is also the case, however, that both regional and international cooperation by 
Latin American countries, either individually or as a group, will follow their own 
needs and priorities. One good example of this is the dynamic cooperation of 
Brazil, India, and South Africa in the framework of the IBSA agreement.
CoMMon/ColleCtive reGulation oF aCtivities and serviCes
Considering the increasing interdependence of activities and countries, a particu-
lar global governance concern will be the common regulation of such activities, 
services, and public utilities. It does not make sense to have a regulatory author-
ity for each country in fields that are integrated by globalization or formal integra-
tion agreements. The creation of common regulatory authorities, a phenomenon 
today arising in Europe,3 is likely to be extended universally over time.
In Latin American countries there are areas, especially with regard to natural 
resources, that are shared by two or more countries and where national borders 
are hindering the possibility of rational regulation and exploration. The move 
towards supra-national regulation is especially necessary in the case of the Ama-
zon region, shared by at least six countries, as well as in the general field of raw 
materials, such as oil and iron, but especially water.
1 Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa.
2 Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are the Latin American members of G20.
3 Europe is creating a new type of international regulatory authority. Some examples are the European Aviation 
Safety Agency; European Food Safety Authority—EFSA; European Maritime Safety Agency—EMSA; Body of 
European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications—BEREC; the European energy regulators the Council 
of European Energy Regulators (CEER) and the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG); and 
the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities—EPRA; among others.
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It is possible that common regulatory authorities will emerge to ensure effective 
governance of those sectors and activities. There are already some initiatives 
which are attempting to provide common authority, such as the Commission of 
Regional Electrical Integration (CIER), a nonprofit association of the state-owned 
electrical corporations of ten South-American countries.4
the searCh For a satisFaCtory PolitiCal systeM
An ongoing trend in the Latin American political climate relates to the difficulties 
and contradictions countries face in finding a satisfactory political system. Since 
independence, the possibility of reconciliation between the old elites and other 
social classes, immigrant groups, and more progressive political parties and 
ideas remains a utopian vision, never completely achieved.
Another historical problem has been to define the fields and limits of state inter-
vention. Traditionally, national economies, strongly dependent on the interna-
tional financial and trade system, struggled to achieve sound domestic progress. 
Since the aftermath of World War II, dramatic breaks and shifts have occurred. 
During the late 1940s, many Latin American countries entered a development 
era. In this period, the state was preeminent—both in democratic and dictatorial 
regimes—as the sole planning and funding actor as well as the producer of goods 
and services. During the 1980s and 1990s there was a rapid change to market-
oriented economies with the government as a mere regulator. Now, the general 
regional pattern is a return of the state to a more active role.
The problem is that policies and models were discarded before being fully imple-
mented. Presently, two main models are being followed: a democratic way to 
economic and social development (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and probably Colom-
bia and Peru) and a populist political system with a confused economic pattern 
(Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela). Some countries are still undefined (Mexico, 
Bolivia, and Paraguay) and others maintain archaic styles (Cuba and Nicaragua).
Another emerging question is how to admit civil society organizations, corpora-
tions, and other social actors into the political decision-making process. In other 
words, the question is how to reinforce institutions by allocating nongovernmen-
tal social actors within them. At the same time, Latin American states need to 
determine how to strengthen governance through administrative reform in order 
to update their management, juridical, economic, and technological tools and 
techniques.
4 See CIER site at: http://www.cier.org.uy/
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strenGtheninG and weakeninG oF nation-states
The fifth trend is the cyclical political and economic strengthening of some coun-
tries and the parallel weakening of others. The changing status of Latin Ameri-
can countries in relation to the world depends on many factors, of which the 
most important among them relate to internal political considerations. Actions 
by powers outside of the region have also had an impact.
Both internal and external factors explain the rise and fall of Argentina—from 
the 10th wealthiest nation per capita in the world in 1913 to 62nd by 2010. 
In 1913 the country was firmly linked to the British economy. Its slow decline 
began after World War II, when President Perón’s political activity and economic 
policies engaged the country in a succession of social struggles, coups d’état, 
weak governments, and populist political models. Uruguay, also strong at the 
beginning of the 20th century and whose economy was also firmly linked to 
British imports, became a very weak economy because of the decrease in its 
terms of trade ratio. Trade ratios explain fluctuations in many cases. The present 
world economic situation is very favorable to Latin American countries rich in 
natural resources because of the increase in the price of commodities.
Periods of recession have provoked unemployment and emigration. Increasing 
and permanent emigration of citizens to rich countries, especially the United 
States, has characterized recent Latin American experience. The consequences of 
such emigration are well known: difficulties of integration, rejection and threats 
to an immigrant’s human rights, coupled with money transfers to the countries of 
origin that, in many cases, constitute a significant share of national income. The 
presence of Latin American immigrants is not limited to rich countries, however. 
There are numerous contingents in other Latin American countries, including 
Bolivians, Paraguayans, and also Africans—especially Angolans—in Brazil; Boliv-
ians, Paraguayans, and Chileans in Argentina; and Colombians in Venezuela.
The presence of a large number of Latin American immigrants in other coun-
tries, as far as they maintain permanent links with their countries, stimulates the 
idea of nations without borders. Over time, one can even foresee Latin American 
nations that transcend formal country borders. 
inCoMe ConCentration, reGional iMbalanCe, and soCial 
 inJustiCe and inequity
The permanence of income concentration, growing regional imbalance, and 
social injustice and inequity have traditionally helped to explain social and 
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 political instability. Recent shifts in such patterns in some countries and regions 
suggest that positive change is occurring. Chile, Chiapas in Mexico, Medellín in 
Colombia, Brazil’s North-East region, and Rio de Janeiro´s shantytowns are all 
good examples of how the social and economic situation of places traditionally 
affected by poverty, injustice, and violence can improve in a relatively short time.
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Section III: Environmental Sustainability
7. environment, Population, and natural resources of 
latin america and the western hemisphere
Anitra Thorhaug
In many aspects, Latin America is natural resource rich. It has a varying environ-
ment dependent on atmospheric, geological, and oceanic forces to distribute 
its plants, animals, humans, forests, fish, and fresh waters. Within the next 50 
years, the addition of 320 million people along with intensive decimation of 
forests and fisheries is likely 
to change aspects of natural 
resources beyond sustain-
ability. Thus, clear action is 
necessary from individuals, 
governance structures, and 
the private sector. Especially 
in terms of natural resources, Latin America cannot be separated by the artificial 
boundaries of man’s mapmaking, colonial languages, and culture imposed on 
the hemisphere. Although the Task Force is focusing on forecasting the future of 
Latin America, what will happen in this region is grounded in the paradigm of 
changes throughout the Western Hemisphere (Thorhaug et al. 2010). 
The water of the Western Hemisphere includes 26 percent of the world’s fresh 
water for 13 percent of the world’s population. Created from the oxygen of three 
of the last remaining primordial forests plus prolific oceanic plants, it is esti-
mated to produce more than 20 percent of the world’s oxygen. The last two sus-
tainable fisheries run along Southeast and West South America, fed by Antarctic 
currents (Garcia and De Leiva Moreno 2001). The animal and plant biodiversity 
of Central and South America contains some of the most important sources of 
plant and animal species of the planet (Peru alone contains as many endangered 
species as the United States and Canada combined). For millennia, the flow of 
air, water, fish, plants, and animals in the hemisphere has sustained the lives of 
Especially in terms of natural resources, 
Latin America cannot be separated by the 
artificial boundaries of man’s map-making, 
colonial languages, and culture imposed on 
the hemisphere.
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its peoples. It has created a sustainable basis of life during the cultures of Amer-
indians for 20,000 years, European colonists for 300 years, and independent 
republics during the last 200 years.
Future trends
Population Growth: The future, however, may be very different from the past three 
millennia, or even the past 400 years. The present delicate balance presents the 
need to plan for challenges rather than reacting to crises as they emerge (as in Haiti, 
for example). Overall, Western Hemisphere inhabitants are projected to increase 
from 889 million to almost 1.2 billion within the next 50 years. This includes a large 
increase in South America from 349 to 522.3 million; Central America from 35.92 to 
78.3 million; the Caribbean nations going from 35.96 to 49.25 million; and Mexico 
from 112 to 136 million (Hughes 1999, 304–326) (see Figure 1). 
Population increases will not be spread evenly throughout Latin America, but 
will be concentrated within Northern Central America and the Andean region 
(between 80 percent and 131 percent per nation). These same regions have not 
only some of the poorest people per capita in Latin America but also the highest 
per capita indigenous population. The larger nations such as Brazil, Venezuela, 
and Argentina are also expected to grow between 28 percent and 34 percent 
within the same period, accounting for much of the total growth due to their far 
larger populations. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 1. total Population history and Projections for the  
western hemisphere regions, 1965–2099
Source: International Futures Model, Hughes 2010
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It is the mountainous nations’ poor, already greatly underserved (in terms of 
education, health services, enfranchisement, and other services such as potable 
water), who will form the bulk of their population growth. This growth will put 
great stress on governance and the delivery of goods and services. A struggle to 
obtain basic life requirements such as potable water, adequate food, and health 
services for children is likely to ensue and will have to be attended to.
Water and Food Demand: In the mountainous regions and the Caribbean, 
the demand for water and food will be greater due to the pressure of increased 
population as well as to rapid industrialization in many parts of Latin America 
and the increased expectations of quality of life within industrialized nations. 
At present, the problems of potable water and increased food demand for 
populations with malnutrition (including the poor earning under $2/day) are not 
resolved and will only become more pressing in the near future. Two fundamen-
tal obstacles in meeting these demands are the lack of space to increase farming 
in the mountainous areas of Central and South America coupled with the low 
yield the typical farmer derives per acre from his field. 
Additionally, many of Latin America’s most important sites of global biodiversity 
(the library for future crops, pharmaceuticals, and wildlife) are in these same 
mountains. Basic services such as sewage treatment (serving only 15 percent of 
residences in Latin America) are continually ignored, leaving a large catch-up 
for government or private industry to deliver potable water, even where large 
volumes of fresh water exist. Notably, the Caribbean has the lowest ratio of water 
per capita in the hemisphere due to low precipitation. 
Energy: Energy futures show that despite an abundance of reserves of fossil energy 
in many Caribbean countries—as well as sources of renewable energy in Brazil, 
Ecuador, and Peru—demand will outstrip production during most of the next 50 
years (Mitchell, Thorhaug, and Tobar 2010, 99–109). In the short term, nations are 
turning increasingly to natural gas, which is found in abundance throughout the 
coastal plains regions of the hemisphere and is the least polluting to air resources. 
Meanwhile, forward-planning nations are utilizing other renewable sources such as 
hydropower and solar. The steps now being taken by Argentina-Paraguay and by 
Colombia to build large hydroelectric plants, as well as Argentina’s increased usage 
of natural gas vehicles, are examples of rapid shifts away from coal and petroleum. 
However, according to the International Futures Model, demand from rapidly 
industrializing economies will outpace the production of energy by about 30 
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percent or more in all nations of the region except Venezuela (Mitchell, Tho-
rhaug, and Tobar 2010, 99–109). The future of Latin America’s industrialization 
itself is dependent on filling this energy production gap. Despite the high levels 
of energy resources that have been discovered recently, North America will also 
face a demand-production challenge. Mexico is experiencing the first production 
downturn of its oil rich economy in decades. Authorities there acknowledge that 
the best alternative is exploration to bring production back to a high level. Such 
an appreciation is central to Mexico’s promised and planned development. The 
best strategy for Latin America in this uncertain world is to be energy indepen-
dent as a region, rather than trying to solve the problem by energy imports from 
other regions.
Health: The problem of health is bimodal. Citizens who receive little to no 
health care, no emergency health services, and no vaccinations or infant health 
services have the highest infant mortality (up to 122 infants dying before the 
age of 5 per every 1,000 born in rural Bolivia, for example). For Latin America’s 
industrializing nations, however, the infant mortality rate as of 2010 has dropped 
dramatically compared with rates just a generation ago. This is no doubt due to 
the increase of vaccinations and use of antibiotics. 
Longevity of the populations of Latin America in the last half-century is also 
increasing. An example repeated throughout the region is that of Bolivia, which 
has gone from an average male life expectancy in the low 40s in 1965 to an aver-
age around 58 years (which also partially accounts for the increase in popula-
tion). At the same time, females are living about eight years longer than males. In 
addition, citizens in the region’s industrializing nations who benefit from modern 
medicine are experiencing technological breakthroughs that will improve their 
health and extend their lives.
Much of the direction of health in Latin America will be decided by budgetary 
allocations, especially if there is effective governance and low levels of corrup-
tion. Not surprisingly, the quality of public health services is highly correlated 
with good governance. It is important to spread the health services so that major 
epidemics, such as Haiti’s recent outbreak of cholera, will be avoided.  
environMental ProbleMs
Critical, non-sustainable environmental issues include deforestation, loss of 
fisheries, loss of biodiversity, water pollution, lack of sufficient water for ecologi-
cal systems, and climate change. The consequences of the degradation of Latin 
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American and hemispheric resources will be felt in food production and water 
availability, especially by groups struggling on less than $2 per day. 
Deforestation: The deforestation problem is intimately linked to lost biodiver-
sity and is occurring concurrently with biodiversity loss in rivers and seas. The 
forest and biodiversity resource losses will particularly affect Northern Central 
America, the Andean areas, and the Amazonian forest (shared by eight nations) 
(FAO 2005 and Meyers et al. 2000, 853–858). The destruction of forests for more 
farming or ranching areas, along with the expansion of villages and urban cen-
ters, will be severe until controlled by consent of the governed. All major forests 
are global biodiversity hot spots and will be continually diminished in the future. 
Water Scarcity: The region must confront the reality of allocating limited water 
resources in response to highly increased human consumption, increasing 
industrial usage, more intense agriculture, and ecosystem needs. Unfortunately, 
ecosystems tend to have the lowest priority in what is too often becoming a 
zero-sum game between competing demands. Furthermore, the doubling of 
population means half the water per capita if precipitation remains constant. So 
ecosystem resources, such as forests and marshes, become ever more important 
for the purification of water through underground seepage and recycling. 
Many Latin American nations avoid their water governance responsibility at 
local and federal levels. There are some areas where sufficient water will be 
maintained, but others will need a far greater water management effort (Mexico, 
the Caribbean, Central America, the Andean nations, and Argentina).
Food Production and Fisheries: Food production not only consumes a large 
percentage of national water but also requires farmers to control their soil 
loss into the ecosystems by buffering the fields with vegetation (so that soil 
is retained during heavy rains and other wind events). Buffering could clear 
streams, near shore estuaries, and coastlines. It could also lead to the retention 
of residual soil, especially important in mountainous areas.
The problem of fisheries is several-fold. First, fish nurseries are being destroyed 
for many species, especially those near the shore where artisanal fishermen 
tend to dominate. Second, factory fishing by foreign fleets in both the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans is rapidly depleting stocks. It is of the highest priority that 
the hemisphere act together to ban such hemispheric fish resource piracy. Uni-
versity of British Columbia Professor Daniel Pauly (2002, 689–695) has stated 
that within 50 years the Pacific and Atlantic fishing catch will be decimated if 
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present fishing levels continue. Such decimation is taking place in the world’s 
largest ecosystem. If there is such a drop in fish stocks just when 320 million 
more people have entered the hemisphere, continued nutrition and health 
gains will be jeopardized. 
Climate Change: Many of the drivers of climate change result from physical and 
chemical forces within the Western Hemisphere, including ocean currents, atmo-
spheric interaction with oceans, fresh water, and forests. The oceans contain the 
earth’s heat pump, which maintains temperatures within a range that makes 
possible agriculture and other activities required for the human population den-
sity as we know them. Amazonia’s rainfall is a combination of cycling of waters 
evaporated from the Atlantic and seasonal winds. 
The activities of humans in this hemisphere are now intense enough to over-
balance the natural cycles as they have occurred for millennia in the Middle East 
and coastal China. The question of climate change affecting melting glaciers in 
the Andes (which benefits agriculture in the short term due to the melt water) 
must be balanced against the end of glacial melt and the resulting greater arid-
ity that will mostly affect very poor populations. The water cycles between the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Amazon, as well as other climates such as those Pacific 
nations with deserts (Mexican, Peruvian, Chilean, and the Caribbean environ-
ments) would also be affected by climate change.
ConClusions
Fluctuating natural environments and resources are the norm in the hemisphere. 
However, there are tipping points that will have dire consequences if exceeded. 
Oceans, fresh water, forests, fisheries, deserts, populations, agriculture, and plant 
and animal populations have varied widely in time and space, both in the hemi-
sphere and the nations comprising Latin America. The populations and govern-
ing leaders now occupying the Latin American nations appear not to understand 
their effect on natural resources. They will need to appreciate and adjust soon to 
ensure future sustainability of their nations. 
Policies and actions must point toward sustainability to make the future tenable. 
Critical steps include:
• Careful stewardship of forests and biodiversity 
• Fresh water allocation and water pollution reduction
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• Soil retention for agriculture 
• Fishery sustainability (both near shore and offshore as well as in lakes and 
rivers)
• Lower capture from fisheries and more mariculture 
• Reduced emissions from petroleum and coal while switching to more sustain-
able energy sources, including natural gas. 
Above all, governments, industry, and individuals must be more aware of the 
role they have to play to deal with and overcome the environmental challenges 
over the next 50 years if the region is going to be able to sustain itself as we have 
known it. 
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Section IV: Outside Actors
8. taking the China Challenge: China and the Future 
of latin american economic development
Kevin P. Gallagher1
Over the past 30 years, both China and nations across Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) have sought to move away from inward-looking economic mod-
els and to integrate into the world economy. In 1980 the collective economic out-
put of Latin America was seven times larger than China’s. Now China’s economy 
is larger than all of the economies in Latin America combined. 
In the process of leapfrogging over Latin America and the Caribbean, China has 
tugged some Latin American economies along with it. However, the longer-run 
implications could prove less favorable unless Latin America rises to the chal-
lenge and uses China as a Latin American opportunity. 
China’s demand for LAC products will only increase into the future. This demand 
will feed a rapidly industrializing and diversifying economy in China. LAC 
nations should help stabilize their economies through exporting to China and 
use that space to follow China’s lead in building a diversified economy. 
China’s rise and laC develoPMent
Over the past decade, China’s rise has been of great benefit to LAC. The region’s 
exports to China jumped nine times between 2000 and 2009 in real terms, 
far outpacing Latin America’s overall export growth. In 2009, Latin American 
exports to China reached $41.3 billion (2005 USD), almost 7 percent of all Latin 
American exports. The pre-financial crisis peak, 2006, for exports to China was 
$22.3 billion.2
These trends have helped spur economic growth in Latin America, not only 
because China is an export destination, but also because Chinese demand 
1 The author would like to thank Elen Shrethsa for research assistance.
2 Unless otherwise noted, all figures in this analysis from Kevin P. Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski (2010).
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 constrains global supply and thus raises the price that Latin Americans receive 
for exports from other trading partners as well.
However, this windfall has not been widely shared: five countries and a handful 
of sectors generated just over 80 percent of all regional exports to China. Iron and 
copper ores, crude oil, and soybeans from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and 
Peru supply a portion of China’s fuel. Chinese foreign investment, now totaling 
over $30 billion, has flowed in large part to these same countries and sectors.
While much of the attention regarding China and LAC focuses on the LAC region’s 
direct relations with China, relatively less attention has focused on the extent to 
which Chinese firms compete with LAC firms in the region and in third markets 
outside of LAC or China. In our 
research, Roberto Porzecanski 
and I found that nearly all 
Latin America and Caribbean 
exports are under “threat” from 
China (Gallagher and Porzecan-
ski 2010). Drawing on previous 
work with the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, we characterize a 
“threat” as those products in world markets where China’s market share is increas-
ing, while the market share of Latin America and the Caribbean is either decreasing 
or increasing at a slower rate than China’s share. We found that 92 percent of Latin 
American manufacturing exports is threatened by China, representing 39 percent of 
the region’s total exports.
China is not to blame. These trends are largely the result of policies taken by 
Latin American countries. Many adopted “shock therapy” or the “Washington 
Consensus” tenets. Governments rapidly liberalized trade and investment 
regimes and reduced the role of the state in economic affairs, often through 
privatizations that, in a number of cases, went painfully awry. 
China has taken a more gradual approach to integrating with world markets. In 
contrast to Latin America, China embarked on a program of economic reform aim-
ing at strategic integration into the world economy by following a “dual track” policy. 
The policy consisted of liberalizing foreign investment and inflow of imported 
inputs to selected industries while buttressing those sectors to the point of maturity 
and nurturing other sectors until they were ready to face competition with imports.
These trends have helped spur economic 
growth in Latin America not only because 
China is an export destination, but also 
because Chinese demand constrains global 
supply and thus raises the price that Latin 
Americans receive for exports from other 
trading partners as well.
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takinG the China ChallenGe
China’s demand for LAC products, barring a significant slowdown in the Chinese 
economy, is likely to last for some time into the future. LAC could capitalize on 
that opportunity by solidifying a series of stabilization funds, embarking upon 
a process of “self-discovery” to examine where opportunities for diversification 
may lie, while taking environmental protection seriously.  
Chinese Demand for LAC Products: The main benefit of China’s rise for LAC 
has been China’s increasing demand for LAC commodities. China has become 
a new export destination for LAC products. In addition, China’s demand for the 
basket of goods that LAC offers the world in general has boosted global prices for 
many of those goods and thus has indirectly helped LAC export as well. But will 
that demand last?
Predicting far into the future is beyond any economic modeling available. Liter-
ally anything could happen, including the discovery or invention of new prod-
ucts that could substitute for LAC exports. With those caveats in mind, it seems 
that China will have interest in LAC’s four core commodity exports to China for 
a significant period into the future. Figures 1–4 compare annual income levels 
and per capita consumption of crude oil, iron ore, copper, and soybeans with the 
consumption patterns between China, South Korea and Japan—as well as with 
the United States in some cases. 
Figure 1. Crude oil Consumption Per Capita
Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010; The World Bank 	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Such juxtaposition allows us to examine how China’s consumption of key LAC 
commodities compares with the consumption path of other East Asian middle- 
and high-income nations, and the United States. By this admittedly crude mea-
sure, in three out of the four cases it will be some time before China’s markets 
are saturated with key LAC commodities.
In terms of oil consumption, South Korea and Japan’s consumption of crude oil 
has peaked at approximately 15 barrels of oil per person. For South Korea that 
peak came at $10,000 GDP/capita, for Japan at $18,000. If the Chinese annual 
consumption growth rate of crude oil from 1960 to 2008 continues at its histori-
cal pace, China will hit the East Asian plateau in 46 years. If the growth rate is 
one quarter of the historical rate, China will reach that level of oil consumption 
in 183 years.
By these calculations, it appears that China will demand significant amounts 
of iron ore for some time as well. This could be good news for nations such as 
Brazil, which accounts for 65 percent of all Chinese imports of iron ore. If China 
consumes at its historical rate, it will reach Japan’s level of consumption in 50 
years; if China consumes one quarter of the historical average, it will not reach 
Japan’s levels for over 190 years.
	  
Figure 2. iron ore Consumption Per Capita
Note: Apparent consumption = Production + Import - Export 
Sources: Iron Ore Statistics 2010 (UNDP); The World Bank
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For copper, there is no data available for South Korea, but here we can also see 
that China seems to generally be following the path of Japan but wouldn’t reach 
Japanese levels for 70 years or more.
The case of soybeans is the most interesting because, compared to fellow East 
Asian nations, China seems to have met the same level of soy consumption as its 
neighbors but at a much lower level of GDP per capita. If this is the case, Chinese 
demand for soybeans may not last. Also, neither South Korea nor Japan has a 
significant livestock industry that needs soy as a feedstock. However, China has 
begun such a sector and a better comparison may be the United States, where 
the majority demand for soy is in its feed sector.
This exercise is by no means the last word on the subject. Still, if the Chinese 
economy continues to grow, it is not implausible to predict that demand for at 
least crude oil, iron, copper, and probably even soybeans will sustain for many 
years to come.
Using China to Help with Stabilization: If China does maintain its appetite 
for Latin American commodities, the consequences may not all be beneficial. 
China could accentuate Latin America’s (over) reliance on commodities exports 
and jeopardize the region’s capabilities for diversifying its export basket toward 
	  
Figure 3. refined Copper Consumption Per Capita
Note: Apparent consumption for China, reported consumption for Japan and the U.S. 
Sources: International Copper Study Group; The World Bank
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manufactures and modern services, and cause long-lasting social and environ-
mental impacts. 
Economists also express concern that China’s tug on the LAC export basket will 
inflict the region with Dutch disease, where primary commodity–dependent 
countries do not develop strongly because they are victims of a “resource curse.” 
Nations overly dependent on commodities have been shown to de-industrialize 
because discoveries of such resources and their subsequent export raise the 
value of a nation’s currency. Resource dependency also makes manufactured and 
agricultural goods—as well as services—less competitive, eventually increasing 
imports, decreasing exports, creating balance-of-payments problems, and lead-
ing to poor economic performance. 
In the past few years we have witnessed significant currency appreciation across 
Latin America, though it is not clear that such appreciation has been due to 
commodities prices or other factors. In terms of competitiveness, however, it is 
fairly clear that China is outcompeting Latin America in world manufactures and 
services exports. China has become the most competitive manufactures exporter 
in the world, measured by the China share of manufactures in total world manu-
factures exports. 
Figure 4. soybean Consumption Per Capita
Note: Soybean consumption per capita is domestic supply quantity divided by total population. 
Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization; The World Bank.
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Reliance on commodities can accentuate employment and environmental prob-
lems as well. For example, between 1995 and 2009, Brazilian soy production 
quadrupled, in part due to the fact that approximately half of all Brazilian soy 
exports went to China. At the same time, employment in the soy sector shrank 
as cultivation became highly mechanized. Moreover, increased demand for soy 
has been linked to the deforestation of some 528,000 square kilometers in the 
Brazilian Amazon. Such deforestation has threatened the livelihoods of many 
indigenous Brazilians and contributed to accentuating global climate change.
A number of LAC nations have put in place “stabilization” funds that effectively 
tax export commodities when prices are high in order to stabilize the economy 
when prices are low or when a nation is experiencing a downturn. Of the stabili-
zation funds that exist in the region, Chile’s stands out. To take full advantage of 
China’s appetite for LAC commodities, more nations in the region should put in 
place programs like Chile’s.
Chile’s government revenues have grown in recent years, in large part due to 
higher copper revenues. The share of copper revenues in government revenue 
was 2.4 percent from 1999 to 2002, but leapt between 12.6 and 17.6 percent in 
2004. The state-owned copper company CODELCO accounted for 75 percent of 
government revenues from copper in 2004. Chile’s copper funds have for several 
years been in part appropriated into the Copper Stabilization Fund, established 
in 1986 to isolate public spending from the variation of copper prices and to 
conduct counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy.
In 2006, Chile’s Fiscal Responsibility Law created two new sovereign funds: the 
Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) and the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 
(ESSF). While the purpose of the PRF is to support the sustainability of Chile’s 
elderly and disability pensions, the purpose of the ESSF is to enable Chile’s 
government to conduct counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy. According to 
Chile’s Ministry of Finance, the ESSF was created to finance fiscal deficits during 
periods of weak growth and/or low copper prices as well as to pay down pubic 
debt. This helps to ensure long-term financing for social programs. The ESSF 
was initially capitalized with US$2.58 billion, most of which ($2.56 billion) came 
from the Copper Stabilization Fund that the ESSF replaced. 
As a result, in years when Chile has a fiscal surplus, the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law establishes that all remaining fiscal surplus must be paid into the ESSF after 
contributions to the PRF (which have to be between 0.2 and 0.5% of GDP) and 
72   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  September 2011
the five year (2006–2010) capitalization of Chile’s Central Bank (in an amount 
that is the difference between the capitalization of the PRF and the effective fis-
cal surplus, with an upper limit of 0.5% of GDP). However, repayments of public 
debt and advanced payments into the ESSF during the previous year can be 
subtracted from this contribution. 
By December 31, 2008, the ESSF was worth more than US$20 billion. As a 
result, in 2008, Chile became a net creditor for the first time in its history. In 
terms of the performance of the ESSF, in 2008 the investments made by the 
ESSF showed a return of 7.63 percent. The annualized net return accumulated 
from March of 2007, when the ESSF stated operating, has been of 9.47 percent. 
Self-Discovery: We know that economic growth and a diversified economy go 
hand in hand. It is important to underscore “diversity” because past analyses have 
focused on moving away from primary commodity production rather than building 
upon and diversifying alongside commodity production. LAC needs to ensure that 
the proper environmental provisions are put in place so that LAC can maintain its 
foothold in commodities markets for years to come. LAC also needs to refocus on 
the competitiveness of products beyond primary commodities.
Diversification strategies will take different forms in different LAC countries. In 
contrast with the past, it will be more important for LAC countries to put in place 
a process of industrial policy, as opposed to policies themselves. Past attempts 
at industrialization in the 
region had a one-size-fits-all 
approach: industrialize in 
all sectors at all costs. New 
more nuanced approaches to 
industrial policy emphasize 
the need to put in place a process whereby policy makers (embedded within the 
private sector) can “self-discover” the binding constraints to economic growth 
in a particular economy. After such a “diagnostic” approach is in place, then the 
policy process can commence. (Hausman and Rodrik 2002)
China embarked on a program of economic reform aiming at strategic inte-
gration into the world economy by following a “dual track” policy. The policy 
consisted of liberalizing FDI and inflow of imported inputs to selected industries 
while buttressing those sectors to the point of maturity and nurturing other sec-
tors until they were ready to face competition with imports. 
In contrast with the past, it will be more 
important for LAC countries to put in place 
a process of industrial policy, as opposed to 
policies themselves.
Latin America 2060: Consolidation or Crisis?     73
Such an approach stands in stark contrast to Latin America. The region experi-
mented with industrial policy during its Import Substituting Industrialization 
period (roughly 1940 to 1980). The approach was a modest success at best. The 
policy did help industrialize nations like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and others 
in the region. Yet, with a few exceptions many of the firms within those indus-
tries were extremely inefficient by global standards because there was too much 
focus on domestic markets. What is more, Latin American industrial policy 
was financed largely by debt, in contrast to export revenue and savings in the 
Chinese case. 
Environmental Protection: China serving as an increasing source of demand for 
LAC products could take a heavy toll on the region’s environment. The environ-
ment is not something to preserve solely for altruistic reasons. Indeed, a stable 
environment will be necessary to sustain the ability of LAC to produce commodi-
ties for years to come. Moreover, Chinese demand will create pressure to design 
new infrastructure projects, such as highways through the Amazon in order 
to get iron, cattle, and soy to Pacific ports. Such projects will need to take the 
environment into account. Nations like Mexico serve as an example of what can 
happen when the environment is ignored. According to official Mexican statis-
tics, the economic costs of environmental degradation have equaled 10 percent 
of GDP per annum since 1985. 
Invigorating and expanding stabilization funds with export revenue from China 
and elsewhere, coupled with an innovative approach to industrialization, could 
form part of a strategy where China is an opportunity for the future of Latin 
American development. A business-as-usual approach could be dangerous. Over-
reliance on primary commodities could cause macroeconomic, employment, 
and environmental problems in the longer run. What’s more, China is already 
swiftly out-competing Latin America in world manufacturing markets. As 
China has shown, nations can conduct economic reforms to great benefit. Latin 
America could and should follow suit.
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9. the decline of u.s. influence in latin america
Riordan Roett
Unless there is an abrupt turn in U.S. policy, America’s future position in the 
Western Hemisphere will continue to slowly decline over the next five decades. 
Traditional diplomatic ties, of course, will remain in place. The United States will 
interact with the region in the context of the Organization of American States 
(OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the National Defense Uni-
versity (NDU), the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other multilat-
eral organizations. U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) will continue to play an 
important role in the region. And trade ties will decline but not disappear. But 
the centuries-old concept of the region as the “backyard” of the United States 
has disappeared. References to the Monroe Doctrine are viewed as quaint in the 
hemisphere. America’s current deficits make it difficult to imagine new financial 
initiatives—and it is doubtful that most of the countries in the region would want 
to be beholden to Washington, D.C., as in the past, even if America’s fortunes 
improve over the coming decades.
The following trends appear to be irreversible in United States–Latin American 
relations for the foreseeable future. Again, there could be a dramatic change in 
U.S. policy, but it would have to accommodate the new realities in the region. 
That will not be easy for the United States given the longstanding belief that the 
asymmetries between the North and the South are immutable. But the tables are 
turning, to the advantage of the Western Hemisphere.
the GrouP oF twenty
The Global Financial Architecture: The financial crisis that began in 2008 was 
not caused by the emerging market economies; it occurred because of major 
policy mistakes in the United States and the European Union (EU). Indeed, many 
of the countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region had taken 
precautionary steps in the decade preceding the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
to forestall a banking crisis and related institutional deficiencies. At the end 
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of 2008, in recognition of the financial reality, the administration of George W. 
Bush decided to reconstitute the Group of Twenty (G20)—the largest economies 
in the world—for an emergency meeting in Washington, D.C. Prominent among 
the group members was Brazil, followed by Mexico and Argentina. It became 
clear at that meeting, and in subsequent summits in London, Pittsburgh, Toronto 
and Seoul, that the old order, dominated by the G-7 industrial countries, had 
imploded. A new financial architecture, badly needed, would require the active 
participation of the new emerging market economies. In that process, Brazil 
would play an increasingly important role (Roett 2010, 127–144).
Brazil’s emergence as a global player represented the work of two administra-
tions—Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994–2002) and Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva 
(2002–2010). Following the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999, policy initia-
tives were taken to insure that the Brazilian economy would not be exposed to 
the risks of the 1990s. Some countries took a similar position (Uruguay, Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru); others did not (Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador). 
It became clear in the successive summits that the “chairs and shares” at institu-
tions such as the IMF would need to be adjusted to represent the interests of 
the emerging economies. Subsequent consultations led to a decision to reduce 
the representation of the European Union and increase the voting power and 
financial contribution of countries such as India, China, Brazil, and South Korea. 
It is clear that future decision making regarding global financial arrangements 
will need to include the policy preferences of those and other countries, such as 
South Africa. The Bretton Woods arrangements of the post–World War II period 
are slowly yielding to new realities.
Trade Issues: In the attempt to come to a global agreement on trade issues, 
years have been spent on intensive negotiations known as the “Doha Round.” 
The final effort collapsed in a meeting in Geneva in July 2008 when India and 
China refused to accept an apparent compromise proposal put forward by the 
EU and the United States. Brazil was willing to pursue further negotiations to 
make the compromise palatable to the other emerging market countries, but 
those efforts failed. If and when the Doha Round is resuscitated, it is clear that 
the United States and the EU will not be able to dictate the terms of reference 
as they have in the past. The emerging market economies will need to be part 
of the entire process, not handed a final draft at the last minute. Once again, 
the countries of Latin America will have to be given a greater voice in future 
trade negotiations.
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the briC Countries, ibsa, and other Global realities suCh as China
The BRIC Countries: In recent years, it has become clear that the countries of 
Latin America have sought to diversify their global relations without the tutelage 
of the United States. Conceived as an investment strategy by Goldman Sachs 
in 2001, the BRIC concept—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—has taken hold, 
and these countries are now 
seen as the avant-garde of the 
emerging market economies. 
If growth trends continue as 
predicted, they and a small 
number of other emerging 
market economies will replace the traditional EU economies over the next few 
decades as the largest economies in the world. Met with cynicism when first 
proposed by Goldman, the BRIC idea has taken on a life of its own.
Brazil is a strong advocate of the group and hosted the second summit of BRIC 
leaders in Brasília in April 2010. The group is not a new monolith seeking to 
dominate the world; it is a symbol of the rise of new global players that are not 
beholden to the United States. They have similar interests in some policy arenas 
and differences in others, as was seen in the last Doha trade round in 2008. But 
they represent the new, emerging world order.
IBSA: The India, Brazil, and South Africa initiative known as IBSA was also 
undertaken without the participation or approval of the United States. Estab-
lished in 2003, following the failed Cancún WTO Conference, the three countries 
were determined to enhance South-South cooperation. The aim of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum is to provide a framework for cooperation in the fields of agricul-
ture, trade, culture, and defense.
At the first meeting in Brasília in June 2003, the countries called for reform of the 
UN Security Council and discussed measures to combat international terrorism, 
transnational crime, and illegal arms dealing. The foreign ministers highlighted 
their priorities on promotion of social equity and inclusive growth by reiterating 
the need for tackling hunger and poverty. Brazil hosted the most recent IBSA 
summit in April 2010. The Forum will expand over time to emphasize the South-
South agenda of the emerging market countries. It complements the interests 
of the BRIC countries, two of which are founding members of IBSA. Moreover, 
it takes to task developed nations for failing to address poverty and inequality 
at the global level. IBSA and similar fora will emerge over the next decades to 
In recent years, it has become clear that the 
countries of Latin America have sought to 
diversify their global relations without the 
tutelage of the United States.
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represent the policy preferences of the developing countries and will often be 
critical of the positions of the industrial countries.
China: Since the visit of President Hu Jintao to South America in 2004, relations 
between Beijing and the countries of South America have developed rapidly and 
will continue to do so. Mexico and Central America will not benefit in the same 
way since their economies often compete with Chinese manufactures seeking to 
enter the North American market. 
Two trajectories merged with the visit of the Chinese president. The first was 
the emergence of China as a global player in trade, finance, and diplomacy. In 
particular, the impressive growth rates of the Chinese economy require a con-
stant flow of raw materials and commodities from developing countries. South 
America, abundant in both, has benefitted in a dramatic way from the two-way 
trade relationship. Soybeans, copper, iron ore, and many other products are now 
a staple of the trade ties between the region and mainland China. As the relation-
ship continues to grow, there will be voices warning of a new dependence of the 
region on one country and on earnings from the export of their products. This is 
a legitimate argument that will need to be addressed in the region—that greater 
emphasis should be placed on adding value to traditional exports and finding 
a way to produce more competitive products for world markets in the decades 
ahead (Roett and Paz 2008).
There was a great deal of criticism following President Hu Jintao’s visit that China 
was only interested in exploiting the region’s comparative advantage in commodi-
ties and raw materials. But slowly the second component of China’s expansion has 
begun to materialize and will undoubtedly be a key link in the decades ahead—
direct investment. By 2010–2011, the investment stream has increased and will 
remain in the longer-term relationship between South America and China.
It was announced at the end of 2010 that China spent more than $15 billion in 
oil and gas deals in South America. China’s Petrochemical Corporation pur-
chased Occidental Petroleum’s operation in Argentina for $2.45 billion. That deal 
followed the decision by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) 
agreement to pay $7 billion for British Petroleum’s 60 percent stake in Argen-
tina’s Pan American Energy company. China’s state-owned chemicals group, 
Sinochem, successfully won the bid to develop a share of the Peregrino oil field 
off the coast of Brazil; the purchase price was $3.1 billion. While these are all 
energy-related investments, the expansion from commodities and raw materials 
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to energy investment will, over time, open opportunities for China in manufac-
turing and other areas of the South American economies.
other reGional initiatives
There are also other Latin American undertakings without U.S. participation that 
highlight the drift of the region away from the traditional power dynamics. Often 
instigated by Brazil, an acknowledged regional leader, these efforts will grow to 
represent the interests of the region without particular reference to the interests 
or wishes of the United States. Beginning in 2000, a series of South American 
summits were held in the region. At the third summit, held in Cuzco, Peru, 
in 2004, the South American Community of Nations (SACN) was established. 
SACN proposed to bring together two sub-regional trade blocs, Mercosur and 
the Andean Community of Nations. At a subsequent summit meeting in Brasília 
in 2005, the participating heads of state decided to create the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) to replace SACN.
In 2009, the first meeting of the new South American Defense Council met in 
Santiago, Chile. The purpose of the Council is to preserve the region as a zone 
of peace and as a base for democratic stability. Other initiatives have included a 
Latin American and Caribbean Summit for Integration and Development (CALC). 
Held in Northeast Brazil, the first CALC summit brought together thirty-three 
states in the hemisphere, including Cuba. Symbolically, the United States, 
Canada, and the EU were not invited to attend. At the initiative of Mexico, a sum-
mit of the Rio Group, founded in 1986, and the Caribbean Community (Caricom), 
met in Mexico in 2010; it was called the “Unity Summit” to bring together all of 
the countries in the hemisphere, minus the United States and Canada.
ConClusions
There is widespread skepticism in the United States that any of these initiatives 
will prosper or endure. The cynics in Washington, D.C., may be correct, but the 
trajectory of global and regional initiatives of the last decade is the template for 
the future of U.S.–Latin American relations. Normal ties will obviously continue 
among the states of the Western Hemisphere and interactions will take place in 
various multilateral fora. But even within those fora, the South American states 
in particular will seek to expand and diversify their economic, political, and 
diplomatic contacts with less and less reference to the wishes or interests of the 
United States. There will be many policy arenas in which the United States and 
individual states in the region will cooperate and collaboration with sub-regional 
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groups, such as free trade agreements, will continue. The presence of new play-
ers, such as China today, and probably India tomorrow, represents an historical 
development that is probably irreversible. Overall, the probable path to 2060 
is an increasingly independent hemisphere, with greater indifference in South 
America to U.S. interests than in Mexico and Central America. 
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Section V: Socio-Cultural Capacity
10. Projecting education, knowledge, and authority 
in latin america
Dylon Robbins
What does the future hold for education in Latin America? And what role shall 
it play in regional integration? The UNESCO Institute for Statistics would seem 
an appropriate place to begin our inquiry, for it regularly assembles data sets 
and generates reports on education and literacy throughout the world.1 Indeed, 
the breadth of information that it offers, in addition to the carefully organized 
reports regarding education and especially literacy in Latin America, demon-
strates an informed concern with guaranteeing a universally available basic 
education for all Latin Americans. 
We can understand this as a mission in assuring the human rights of Latin 
Americans according to Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which states that “everyone has the right to education.” And yet, despite the uni-
versal nature of the right, the particular nature of that education should presum-
ably also be culturally specific, for Article 22 of the same document states that 
“everyone [...] is entitled to [...] [the] cultural rights indispensable for his dignity 
and the free development of his personality.” 
The extent to which statistical analysis can take into account the varying cultural 
specificities of the region’s differing visions of education is worthy of significant 
consideration. This is because 
Latin America, despite the 
predominance of Portuguese, 
Spanish, and French speak-
ers there, is home to millions 
of speakers of indigenous 
and other languages and, 
even when considering only 
1 See for example the selection offered at: http://www.uis.unesco.org
. . . Latin America, despite the predominance 
of Portuguese, Spanish, and French speakers 
there, is home to millions of speakers of indig-
enous and other languages and, even when 
considering only Romance-language speak-
ers, is far from culturally homogeneous.
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Romance-language speakers, is far from culturally homogeneous. When we note 
as well that cultural and ethnic specificities are rarely coterminus with linguistic 
groups, it is apparent that the region’s heterogeneity significantly complicates 
the task of analyzing national-level information on education. 
While data on the percent enrolled or the pupil/teacher ratios throughout the 
region afford us a widely applicable rubric for measuring the features of an 
education system, we should ask what aspects of the experience of education 
in the region may escape the level of generality employed in developing them. 
After all, although two schools in two different enclaves may appear equivalent 
when comparing them according to these criteria, the fact that one may be pro-
viding a Spanish-language curriculum to a rural indigenous group and another 
may be providing a space where an urban middle class can gain eventual access 
to tertiary institutions demands that we contextualize culturally (and socially) 
the realities premising the implementation of education in Latin America. It is 
important, thus, that we approach the problem of education in Latin America 
according to a paradigm that allows us to articulate the difference between these 
and similar circumstances in the region.  
My aim here, therefore, is not to argue that statistical methods are inappro-
priate in this context (in fact, they certainly are), but rather to complement 
their contribution through reference to some central ideas in the cultural 
and intellectual history of Latin America with an interest in exploring some 
questions related to education in the region. Beyond the applicability of 
learned skills and abilities in the public sphere or the marketplace, what 
can be said regarding the lived experience of education in Latin America? 
How may we address, as well, education’s particular use in citizen forma-
tion in the region? What may we say with regard to education’s social and 
cultural relevance?
“la letra Con sanGre entra”: knowledGe, authority, Culture, 
and the state
Tensions between lettered and oral cultures have shaped modern Latin America 
since even before the Incan emperor Atalhuapa would supposedly angrily toss 
a priest’s bible to the ground. “If it is the word of God,” he is presumed to have 
said, “then why can’t it speak?”2 The written word as both divine and earthly law 
was used to dominate and control peoples for whom writing was, in significant 
2 Julio Ortega (2003) analyses and explores the greater implications and complexities of this event and its 
subsequent interpretations.
Latin America 2060: Consolidation or Crisis?     83
ways, a relatively new medium and a foreign technology of knowledge transmis-
sion and inscription. 
The historian Ángel Rama is among the many Latin American intellectuals who 
have studied the tensions between written and oral cultures, and has described it 
using the image of the Lettered City—presumably an enclosed urban space defined 
by its relationship to authorities that use language and writing as instruments of 
power through law, liturgy, and education. He is known in particular for remark-
ing how lettered and oral cultures were split along geographical, ethnic, and social 
lines; written culture was of the white, Creole elites in the cities, while oral culture 
was of the rural indigenous, non-white, or other marginalized cultures.3 
It is the agents of lettered culture, then, who have played central roles in admin-
istering state power in Latin America for centuries. They have also been the 
architects and providers of education in the region—either as priests and monks 
during the Colonial period and early decades after independence, or as secular, 
lettered statesmen beginning in the mid- to late 19th century. 
Literacy education—either as an instrument of evangelization or as a liberal 
campaign to bring outlying regions and peoples into the orbit of a republic’s 
capital—has been experienced by many as an ideologically (and even physi-
cally) violent enterprise of conquest, colonization, and settlement. It is through 
these operations that states have worked with public intellectuals to define and 
enforce hierarchies of cultural production, ones that more often than not have 
favored the cultural features of the ruling classes and ethnicities, while margin-
alizing (and even explicitly criminalizing at many junctures) those of the domi-
nated. In gross and imprecise terms, then, “literature” and writing would trump 
many popular forms in status and relevance with respect to their placement in 
the public sphere, while the general avenues of civil society would be shaped by 
writing, writers, and a lettered consciousness and sociability. 
Public intellectuals, under this model, are those who write and are known for 
their written production. Those public figures who do not write or whose writing 
does not conform to the prevailing models—popular religious leaders, shamans, 
healers, babalãos, rebels, and the like—would be perceived as obstacles to 
political life, “modernization,” and “progress.” Equally important is the role of 
information and knowledge in the Lettered City paradigm, which is viewed as an 
asset to be accumulated and strictly controlled by a few.  
3 Some essential references are Rama (1984; 1996), Ramos (1989; 2001), Cornejo Polar (1994), and  
Franco (2002).
84   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  September 2011
True enough, varied and heterogeneous immigration, mass migrations to the cit-
ies, bilingualism, miscegenation, and the resurgence of non-written media have 
blurred the boundaries between lettered and oral cultures. However, the nearly 
five centuries of this and similar experiences in many parts of Latin America 
have shaped a specific cultural context regarding intellectual authority, written 
culture, access to information, and the state that is different in meaningful ways 
from the way similar phenomena may be conceived in other parts of the world. 
Therefore, faced with the challenge of speaking of education in the longer-range 
future and for the region as a whole, it is necessary to invoke a sufficiently gen-
eral model that already describes the region longue durée. 
The most appropriate model to this end is the tension between oral and written 
cultures and how it has shaped a place of status and power for certain types of 
intellectuals and the strata of culture that they represent as they attempt to shape 
a public through educational and cultural policies. Thus, I approach the problem 
of education in Latin America here by seeking out representative examples of 
how more macroscopic transformations in the relationships between intellectual 
authority, the state, culture, and the people manifest in cultural policy related 
to shaping the greater scope of education. Through an examination of recent 
cultural policies in Cuba and Brazil, we may map out two important axes along 
which to project later transformations in such historically hierarchical relation-
ships. These examples will help to formulate some of the key features likely to 
emerge in terms of the state’s use of culture to form its citizens.    
rethinkinG knowledGe and authority i: the Cuban  
“batalla de ideas” 
The Batalla de ideas (or the Battle of Ideas) was an important initiative of Cuba’s 
post-Soviet era comprising economic, political, and cultural fronts.4 Of particular 
interest are those of its aspects relating to education and the uses of culture, for 
they suggest a reappearance and reconfiguration of the classical model of the let-
tered intellectual, state alliance, and public education that have defined in gross 
measure the cultural history of the region. 
The policies’ aims were, first, to counter the deepening marginalization of 
significant numbers of young Cubans who were otherwise not engaged in 
post- secondary education and, second, to invigorate a general appreciation of 
knowledge and learning among the greater public. This arm of the initiative 
4 Few comprehensive sources address the initiative on the whole. An essential starting point in English is Kapcia 
(2009). Remarks summarizing the initiative in the terms of official state discourse can be found in Castro (2003).
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called upon the participation of state-backed university students in the creation 
of a variety of short-term schools that worked toward a greater universalization 
of a post-secondary level education by having university students teach those of 
their peers not pursuing higher education. 
Likewise, courses were created to train university students as “social workers” 
capable of later incorporating themselves into other institutions or service provid-
ers in the interest of addressing problems of efficiency and accountability that were 
seen as undermining the public’s confidence in their effectiveness and transparency. 
While in a few instances the aim of the initiative was to retrain workers for struc-
tural shifts in the economy, the overall scope invoked education as a means toward 
revitalizing the social fabric through self-improvement and encouraging higher-
order thinking skills (yet only applied to state-sanctioned problems). 
With respect to the general public, two television stations were launched that 
provided an array of educational programs as well as lessons in different dis-
ciplines geared toward educating a wider audience. Furthermore, inexpensive 
editions of fiction, nonfiction, and historical texts from a range of traditions were 
printed and distributed widely to encourage reading. While many of these works 
were literary, or otherwise of “high” culture, the selection included also a range 
of variants that would normally be described as “mainstream” or “middle-brow.”5 
Thus, the book-driven part of this initiative on one level revitalizes the enthusias-
tic literacy campaigns of the first years of the Revolution that sought to enfran-
chise marginalized swathes of society. However, on another level it reinforces the 
status of written culture while adopting a socially stratified approach. 
Certainly, due in part to economic and material limitations, the preferred 
media—print or broadcast—are geared toward top-down communication and 
transmission, leaving little to no space for audience response or feedback. Thus, 
the Batalla de ideas, when seen within the context of the Lettered City, would 
appear to affirm traditional models of authority and their relationships to infor-
mation while at the same time trying to make a circumscribed body of knowl-
edge more available.   
It is also important to note that these initiatives were orchestrated and pushed 
forward in the midst of the direst years of the Cuban Revolution—years marked 
by fuel and food shortages and massive unemployment. It is possible to see in 
these policies a type of quixotic capriciousness in the face of very real hardships, 
5 An array of titles launched electronically for the initiative may be viewed at: http://www.sld.cu/sitios/ 
bibliodigital 
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or an implementation of educational policies that do not immediately address 
the needs of a people confronting daily hunger. There are certainly elements of 
truth in that assessment, and yet on a regional level, the educational initiative 
resonates with the recycling pushes toward greater privatization in certain sec-
tors of Latin American society as a vehicle of “modernization.” 
That is, the educational portion of the Batalla de ideas would seem to argue 
against and even resist (at an absurdly high price even) the trend toward subject-
ing all social procedures to a marketplace logic. Indeed, should the primary 
measure of education’s effectiveness be its use to create and place workers, to 
foster material production, or to answer the demands of capital? The Batalla de 
ideas seems to suggest not. Unfortunately, it has taken place amidst grave histori-
cal circumstances that make it difficult to appreciate.  
rethinkinG knowledGe and authority ii: the brazilian 
 “liberdade diGital”
Liberdade digital (or Digital Liberty) was one of the many noteworthy initiatives of 
Gilberto Gil as the Brazilian Minister of Culture (2003–2008). His role as minister 
was to synthesize the collective efforts of an array of intellectuals in Brazil and 
elsewhere that were interested in rethinking notions of intellectual property in a 
digital age.6 The approach stems from the assumption that if we accept that print 
media have shaped modern consciousness, sociability, and government, how may 
we rethink these areas given the different features and characteristics of digital 
media? Gil has argued that digital media and the technologies that support them 
have further democratized knowledge production and distribution (Gil 2008, 234). 
This has occurred not only by enabling users to respond and alter discourse, but 
also by collapsing the distances—whether concrete or ideological—between the 
“universal” knowledge-producing centers in the world and “marginal” locales. 
Information, according to his estimation, is no longer the exclusive resource of 
the major metropolises; it may now be channeled diffusely throughout the entire 
world, provided the appropriate infrastructure and equipment is available to users. 
Given the newer and more fluid ways in which information may flow, then, how 
should other spheres of life be altered? What should political participation begin 
to look like? How do its characteristics alter notions of sovereignty, work, and 
intellectual capital? 
6 Hermano Vianna has been one of the important Brazilian voices in this initiative, and many of his interventions 
have appeared as edited columns in O Globo or on his blog at: http://hermanovianna.wordpress.com/. Also, see 
Lessig (2001). Likewise, much of the impetus and creative shape of the initiative finds its roots in the open license 
software movement.
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As Gil has noted: “Digital culture brings with it a new idea of intellectual prop-
erty, and [...] this new culture of sharing can and should inform government poli-
cies” (Rohter 2007). Among those policies are a series of programs that trained 
citizens to work with different media to intervene in public debates that affect 
them. Likewise, other programs used education in the arts in order to model citi-
zenship and forms of political participation. Most of these policies set out from 
the premise that the end-user—here, those participating in the programs—should 
have their agency affirmed, a principle that grows from Liberdade digital’s 
approach to information.  
If we situate these policies within the context of Latin American intellectual 
history, it is clear that they constitute a dramatic departure from the centrally con-
trolled knowledge-production model characteristic of the Lettered City paradigm. 
Liberdade digital carries wider implications, then, which send ripples through 
other spheres of Brazilian society as it constitutes a departure from a top-down 
approach to managing knowledge. Furthermore, by emphasizing a model of intel-
lectual property premised upon the principle of sharing rather than amassing and 
retaining, it affirms the agency of information end-users, which is counter to the 
basic assumptions regarding knowledge that underlie much of Latin America’s 
cultural history. It is important to note how these macroscopic changes in the 
politics of rights to information come on the heels of decades of efforts in Brazil to 
further democratize education both by making it more accessible (Chauí) and by 
altering pedagogy and the roles of the teacher (Freire). 
And yet, we should approach with caution the push by Liberdade digital to decen-
tralize knowledge production and distribution. After all, if everyone becomes an 
expert, then in many ways no one is. Indeed, there are points at which liberation 
can begin to look like liberalization. In other words, the push toward a greater 
democratization can also be part of laying the groundwork for the ascendancy of 
other models of authority that are just as limiting and exclusive. 
It is compelling to take the Batalla de ideas and Liberdade digital as two 
examples from which to extrapolate general tendencies in the relationships 
between education, knowledge, and authority in Latin America. If we could 
envision the terrain in 2060, it is likely to unfold somewhere between these two 
tendencies. One represents a critical reaction to alterations in traditional models 
of authority, while the other involves their critical embrace. On balance, then, 
our 50-year projection suggests advancing, if sometimes hesitant, movement 
toward greater diffusion and access to information and knowledge along with a 
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further de-centering of authority. Given the essential role of technologies in such 
a transformation over time, the growing material capabilities of Latin America 
will serve to further facilitate such diffusion and access.  
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Section VI: Policy Recommendations
In many ways, as members of this Task Force have laid out in our discussions 
and in the analyses in this volume, Latin America is at a crossroads. So much 
has been accomplished over the past two decades, but so many challenges 
remain. As we look ahead to the next 50 years and the alternative scenarios that 
may develop, depending on the decisions that policy makers and stakeholders 
reach today or in the near future, we fully appreciate both the challenges and the 
opportunities the region faces. Even though Latin American decision makers do 
not control many of the forces that affect them now, nor will they in the future, 
we have concluded that they have already taken steps that enhance the pos-
sibilities for political, economic, and social consolidation over the longer-range 
future within the arenas that they can influence. 
At the same time, as individual chapters have pointed out, they are buffeted by 
a myriad of problems that could all too easily broaden and deepen over time, 
undermining the important progress already achieved and generating chaos 
instead. In this concluding section of the book, then, we lay out a wide-ranging 
set of recommendations drawn from our individual analyses. We believe that 
these, if implemented even in part, will significantly increase the likelihood of 
sustainable political, economic, and social consolidation in Latin America over 
the next 50 years.    
eConoMiC Growth and develoPMent
• Stabilization funds that set aside a portion of commodity revenues, such as 
Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF), can cushion volatility. 
The difficulty for most countries is to distinguish between short-term fluctua-
tions and long-run growth, and to manage political pressure to reduce taxes 
and poverty.
• Over the longer term, export diversification would help mitigate the impact 
of a secular decline in commodity prices. Chile has done some of this in fruits, 
wine, and fish, but exchange rate appreciation and the covariance of primary 
commodity prices limit progress.
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• Capital controls can provide a defense against appreciation, but governments 
can do more than impose modest taxes. Most oil and mineral leases are 
government owned; the pace of concessions to foreign capital is under public 
control. Stronger banking regulation can stem speculative inflows and shore 
up the stability of the financial sector.
• Latin America must raise labor productivity to counter the effect of uncom-
petitive currencies and relatively high wages. To do so requires better educa-
tion, technical training, and infrastructure.
• Stronger skills and better infrastructure can facilitate a move up the value 
chain. The goal is to create jobs by producing inputs such as seeds and fertil-
izer and processing primary commodities into steel, copper tubes, animal 
feed, or meat. Latin America has to be more aggressive both in trade negotia-
tions and in improving product quality.
• Advanced South American economies can diversify the service sector to 
improve current account balances. Brazil now sells oil services to Africa and 
financial services to the Latin American regional market. These service sectors 
create jobs at a wide range of skill levels.
• Finally, ethnic and racial tension is far from resolved and fuels both political 
and economic instability. To the extent that the region relies on primary com-
modities, it must resolve disputes about who will benefit from this strategy.
• The world division of labor and the comparative advantage that represent its 
endowment of natural resources open a door for economic growth in the LAC 
countries for decades to come. The capital and technology needed for develop-
ing these sectors require opening them up to private operators both national 
and foreign. 
• Growth based on the production of primary goods is high-capital and low-
labor intensive and tends to generate high revenues with little employment. 
State ownership of the natural resources opens a window for negotiating in 
the concession contracts transfer of technology and domestic employment cre-
ation. Employment in clusters to produce inputs and to process the primary 
goods may partially offset the low employment ratio in the extractive indus-
tries themselves.
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• The main challenges for LAC countries that have adopted a growth strategy based 
on the exploitation of natural resources in a world constrained by the limited 
supply of raw materials are to create credible institutions in order to efficiently 
administer these resources, to attract investment, to extract the wealth-creation 
potential of these sectors, and to minimize their macroeconomic distortions.
GovernanCe, deMoCraCy, and the state
• There needs to be a significant strengthening of police forces to combat 
the spike in criminal activity in many countries that threatens to undermine 
democratic institutions.
• It is crucial to achieve greater transparency in public financing through pub-
lic disclosure of information on ministry and agency websites.
• LAC should seek ways to make better use of the OAS Santiago Resolution 1080 
(1991) and the Democratic Charter (2001) to forge collective responses to 
abuses of democratic procedures and practices that fall short of actual military 
or self-coups.
• Convocation of a multilateral conference on the continuismo problem 
would help to determine areas of consensus on ways to limit extended or 
indefinite terms of office for elected heads of state.
• In order to strengthen political parties through leadership training, cadre 
workshops, and democracy institutes, resources should be expanded, ideally 
administered by multilateral organizations rather than by individual country-
directed programs.
• In order to increase citizen participation and monitoring mechanisms on 
the state, LAC should develop civil-society organizations with the support 
of the state and the private sector. Civil-society organizations should not 
prevent the existence of organizations that promote special interests but 
should offer alternatives which serve to mitigate the power of such special 
interest groups.
• It is crucial that LAC countries develop modern political parties that can 
represent the interests of its members and also the NGOs with which they are 
in contact. Such parties should be more open to participation and to debate 
as well. In practical terms, this means establishing and developing associa-
tive networks beyond the boundaries of parties. Horizontal networks-parties 
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need to be interconnected with various social networks, decentralized, and 
have high levels of autonomy at sub-national levels.
• Transforming the public administration should be on the agenda. Citizens 
must be involved in the design of public administration as well as with its 
financing, monitoring, and service provision evaluation. Public services may be 
transformed into (partially) self-sufficient services if specific state agencies are 
interconnected with the communities that support them. 
• A more effective presidency needs to be developed to be able to have a more 
interconnected government, with more limits on some areas of past activity, 
but capable of creating a cascade effect that is ultimately the secret of its power.
• In order to cope with social and institutional fragmentation, territorial diversity, 
and complexity, non-centralized decentralization needs to be expanded so that 
it is both locally multidirectional and intertwined with non-state institutions.
• Most LAC countries require additional judicial reform to further increase 
the capacity of the legal system to prosecute cases more effectively and 
efficiently. Can Chile be a model? (Retraining and replacement of prosecutors 
and judges, introduction of oral adversarial procedures to speed up trial pro-
cesses, longer terms for judges, and elimination of selection processes based 
on political party criteria).
• Future judicial reforms should no longer be aimed at limiting the power of 
the elected branches—as they were in the 1990s—but rather be designed to 
strengthen the states’ constitutional and legal leverage vis-a-vis powerful 
groups currently able to circumvent the law.
• State capacity to extract resources is a central feature of good governance.  
Therefore, the still-pending constitutional and legal fiscal reforms required for 
more efficient and effective tax collection and for healthier revenue manage-
ment systems for the future need to be implemented. 
• Future reforms should also include the elimination of informal and formal 
obstacles to the rule of law, i.e., fueros and special legal regimes for certain 
public officials and private groups still in place in many nations in the region.
• The reputation and legitimacy of judiciaries—which affect state capacity to 
apply the law—would benefit if public perceptions were based on data and 
indicators produced by the judiciaries themselves.
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• Future efforts to enhance access and efficiency in justice procurement will 
require deeper case diagnosis and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. 
The production of better—systematized and comparable—information on court 
rulings and compliance are vital components of a good reform diagnosis and 
evaluation, and also serve to further our knowledge about ways to deepen the 
rule of law. 
• LAC countries need to strengthen capabilities for scenario design and other 
planning techniques.
• In order to achieve economic and social integration, LAC countries should 
undertake efforts to fortify institutions like UNASUR.
• It is crucial to negotiate common treatment of some strategic sectors such 
as environment, telecommunications, energy, nuclear power, transportation, 
public health, migrations, water, and banking, and to establish cooperation 
and regulation through common regional authorities.
• In order to foster the participation of civil society organizations in the 
political decision-making process, continued efforts to implement democratic 
mechanisms are required.
• It is necessary to establish common regional instruments in order to protect 
emigrant and immigrant populations of Latin American countries.
• LAC countries need to pursue initiatives that will eliminate the structures 
and methods that boost income concentration, regional unbalance, and 
social injustice and inequity.
external aCtors: the united states and China
• A White House decision to endorse a permanent seat for Brazil on the 
United National Security Council would help repair relations between Brasilia 
and Washington, D.C., that have developed in recent years.
• The United States should involve the BRIC countries in advancing the discus-
sion of new financial architecture in the context of the G20, as these coun-
tries will play an increasingly important role in the multilateral organizations 
and the world economy. As “stakeholders,” they have an increased interest in 
global financial regulation and transparency.
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• It is in the interest of all parties to address the issues that caused the failure of 
WTO negotiations in 2008, and Brazil would be the best choice in the LAC to 
represent emerging market economies. 
• LAC, China, and the United States have interests in confirming that China’s 
expansion into the hemisphere is not seen as a security threat to the United 
States and in exploring areas of mutual interest for meaningful negotia-
tions—climate change, global trade, and new financial architecture.
environMental sustainability
• Marine fisheries policies in each nation must incorporate sustainability of 
all fish species and the food webs on which they subsist in regulations and 
in practice with regional oversight. This sustainability includes restoration of 
critical habitat for fisheries.
• The problem of poorly managed fisheries beyond the Law of the Sea limits 
of territorial waters must be overcome by mutual monitoring and far better 
regional management, including size and catch limits and seasons of catch. 
• A major priority in most LAC countries is the delivery of potable drinking 
water and the sewerage of urban residential and industrial areas, which are 
critical for sustainability of drinking water resources and health of the citizens. 
• Soil erosion needs to be addressed through the education of farmers about 
sustainable soil management, coupled with government programs to retain 
soil, incorporation of teaching about soil conservation, and reforestation 
programs. 
• A regional policy of aiding infant and maternal health must be put into 
place, funded and supported by the more industrialized nations, in order to 
prevent large-scale disease outbreak and transmission, to stem unrest, and to 
lessen unwanted immigration as the result of population growth from poverty 
areas into more industrialized parts of Latin America.
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soCio-Cultural CaPaCity
• Harness the ability of the Internet to increase the capacity of historically less 
privileged groups to become more aware of opportunities and more educated 
in areas relevant for improving their conditions and circumstances.
• Transform traditional state educational models that emphasize rote learn-
ing to ones that emphasize critical thought to form citizens and innovators 
able to adapt to and alter rapidly changing conditions and situations.
• Use education as a tool for building civil society so that individuals and 
groups can become more engaged in influencing political processes and in 
affecting governance outcomes in constructive ways.
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nomic Future and Modernization and Stagnation: Latin American Agriculture. 
Her work on poverty in Latin America has been presented at the World Bank, 
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ogy and Conservation Biology at Boston University. His research focuses on the 
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on hibernating bats—a disease that has led to the most precipitous decline of bat 
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University of Texas Press in May 2012. Before joining the Boston University faculty, 
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in general, with particular concern for intellectual and cultural histories, 
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Cinematográficos (ICAIC), the Biblioteca Nacional, and Casa de las Améri-
cas. He has published on Cuban cinema, in addition to Walt Disney and 
Sergei Eisenstein, and is presently carrying out research related to visual 
culture and war in the United States in 1898 for a volume edited by Beatriz 
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with establishment of the Riordan Roett Chair in Latin American Studies in 2004.
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national Journal of Arts Management (Montreal), of Policy and Administração 
(Rio de Janeiro), of DICE Dossier/ACRONIM Database (London), and the Droit et 
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